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THE TRILLION DOLLAR PROBLEM OF
UNDERWATER HOMEOWNERS: AVOIDING A
NEW SURGE OF FORECLOSURES BY
ENCOURAGING PRINCIPAL-REDUCING LOAN
MODIFICATIONS
Gregory Scott Crespi*

I. INTRODUCTION
How many U.S. homeowners with outstanding mortgage
obligations have been put into a negative equity position by
the recent decline in housing prices, and to what extent?
Unfortunately, no comprehensive private or governmental
database accurately tracks all real estate price trends,
mortgage loan data, and loan modification information in a
way that would allow one to definitively answer these
questions.' However, it has been credibly estimated that
there are at least 11.3 million U.S. homeowners, and probably
as many as 15.2 million or more, who are "underwater" in
that the outstanding balances on their mortgages exceed the
market value of their homes (these persons are hereinafter
* Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist
University. J.D., Yale Law School, 1985, Ph.D., University of Iowa, 1978. I
would like to thank Jean Braucher, Eric Posner, Alan White, and Brent White
for their insightful and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I
would also like to thank the Dedman School of Law and the Marla and Michael
Boone Faculty Research Fund for their generous support of my research efforts.
1. See
CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT
PANEL,
111TH
CONG.,
FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 14 (Comm. Print
2009).
The existing [mortgage and loan delinquency] data are plagued by
inconsistencies in data collection methodologies and reporting, and are
often simply unverifiable. Worse still, the data being collected are
often not what is needed for answering key questions, namely what are
causing mortgage defaults and why loan modifications have not been
working.
Id.
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referred to as "underwater homeowners"). 2
These two
estimates constitute 23% and 32.2%, respectively, of all
mortgaged residential properties, 3 and some informed
observers expect this percentage to sharply increase to as
high as 48% by 2011 if property values continue to decline in
2. First American CoreLogic, a leading assembler of mortgage-related
information, estimated that 11.3 million homeowners had negative equity as of
the end of 2009, a total of 24% of all residential properties with mortgages.
Press Release, First American CoreLogic, Underwater Mortgages on the Rise
According to First American CoreLogic Q4 2009 Negative Equity Data (Feb. 23,
2010) [hereinafter First American CoreLogic (Feb. 23, 2010)]. This was a
substantial increase from their comparable earlier estimate of 10.7 million
homeowners with negative equity as of September 30, 2009, a total of 23% of all
residential properties with mortgages. Id. These estimates did not include
those homeowners who had negative equity positions as a result of negative
amortization mortgages, or as a result of including the balances of any home
equity lines of credit as well as their primary mortgage obligations. These
recent estimates reflect a significant change in the firm's measurement
methodology. First American CoreLogic had earlier estimated that, as of June
30, 2009, there was a much larger number of 15.2 million homeowners with
negative equity, a total of 32.2% of all residential properties with mortgages.
Press Release, First American CoreLogic, Summary of Second Quarter 2009
Negative Equity Data: New Data Shows Nearly One-Third of All Mortgages
Underwater (Aug. 13, 2009) [hereinafter First American CoreLogic (Aug. 13,
2009)]. The difference here from the later estimates stems from the fact that
this earlier estimate also included those homeowners whose negative equity
stemmed from either negative amortization mortgages or home equity lines of
credit. Id.
Some informed observers are of the view that the earlier and more
inclusive First American CoreLogic measurement methodology presents a more
accurate picture of the scope of the negative equity problem. See, e.g., Brent T.
White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social
Management of the Housing Crisis 1 n.1 (Arizona Legal Studies Discussion,
Paper
No.
09-35,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1494467
(using for his
analysis the 15.2 million underwater homeowners estimate that was presented
in First American CoreLogic (Aug. 13, 2009), supra).
The Congressional Oversight Panel offered a much more conservative
estimate of 7.5 million for the number of homeowners with negative equity, a
number totaling only 18% of all outstanding residential mortgages.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS:
WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 24 N.55 (Comm. Print 2009) (citing to a
September 2008 First American CoreLogic report). However, that lower
estimate is likely a significant understatement because it was based on a
September 30, 2008 First American CoreLogic report that used data that the
firm had compiled nine months before the more current data that was included
in its later and comparable report that was cited by Brent T. White. See White,
supra, at 1. Further, the Panel relied on data that had been compiled fifteen
months before the even more current end-of-2009 data utilized by First
American CoreLogic for its February 23, 2010 report.
3. First American CoreLogic (Feb. 23, 2010), supra note 2; First American
CoreLogic (Aug. 13, 2009), supra note 2.
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some areas of the country.'
These individual negative equity positions are often quite
substantial in size. The same study that conservatively
estimated that 11.3 million homeowners are now underwater
also estimated that the aggregate negative equity for this
large group totaled over $800 billion, an average of $70,700
per homeowner.5 Moreover, many of these homeowners are
underwater by significantly greater amounts than this
average, sometimes by as much as hundreds of thousands of
dollars.' Homeowners this far underwater have relatively
little chance of recouping the equity they once had in their
house, when housing prices were at their 2006-2007 peaks,
through future price appreciation taking place over any
reasonable period of time.
While the disturbing magnitude of this negative equity
problem is becoming more widely understood, what is not
nearly so widely publicized is that the interests of those
underwater homeowners who have significant negative equity
4. White, supra note 2, at 3 n.7 (presenting an August 2009 Deutsche Bank
estimate). In March 2009, the Congressional Oversight Panel much more
conservatively estimated that "over the next few years" a projected 20% of
homeowners would owe more on their mortgages than the value of the homes,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS:
WORKING TOwARDS A SOLUTION 1 (Comm. Print 2009), but that estimate, as
noted above, was based on earlier September 30, 2008 data, while the much
higher Deutsche Bank estimate was offered later in August 2009. See supra
note 2.
5. First American CoreLogic (Feb. 23, 2010), supra note 2. If the larger
and perhaps more meaningful earlier estimate of 15.3 million underwater
borrowers is used, First American CoreLogic (Aug. 13, 2009), supra note 2, the
aggregate amount of negative equity may well exceed $1 trillion. Although, it is
possible that the negative amortization mortgage borrowers and home equity
loan borrowers also included in that earlier estimate may on average have
smaller negative equity positions than do the 11.3 million underwater
homeowners counted under the more restrictive methodology, so that the
aggregate negative equity total for this overall group may fall slightly below $1
trillion in size.
6. White, supra note 2, at 4.
By the second quarter of 2009, for example, over 16% of homeowners
had negative equity exceeding 20% of their home's value, and over 22%
of homeowners had negative equity exceeding 10% of their home's
[Al large percentage of these homeowners were underwater
value ....
by hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Id. "[Forty-seven percent] of homeowners in Nevada had negative equity
exceeding 25% of their home's value, as did 30% of homeowners in Florida,
29% in Arizona, and 25% in California." Id. at 13 n.48 (citing First
American CoreLogic (Aug. 13, 2009), supra note 2).
7. White, supra note 2, at 1.
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positions, but still continue to make their mortgage
payments, would often be better served by their defaulting on
those mortgages and going through a foreclosure proceeding.'
This is often true even given the necessity after default for
then making another housing arrangement, and for enduring
the other adverse consequences that foreclosure may have on
their credit ratings and upon their lives more generally. 9
Such homeowners would be even better off if they could
successfully invoke the threat of default as leverage to
pressure their loan servicers to negotiate a loan modification
that would reduce their outstanding principal balance
sufficiently to eliminate most, or even all, of their negative
equity position and their incentive to default. 10
The overwhelming majority of underwater homeowners
who can afford to do so currently continue to make their
mortgage payments." However, since doing so is often not in
their economic interest if they are significantly underwater,
as many homeowners are, this is a fragile and unstable
situation that could easily reach a "tipping point" 2 and
8. See generally id. at 7-13.
9. See generally White, supra note 2, at 7-13.
10. After a default by an underwater homeowner and after the subsequent
foreclosure sale, the mortgage holders would bear the negative equity losses as
well as the substantial costs of a foreclosure proceeding and any additional
associated loss of property value. The mortgage holders would generally have
little if any hope of obtaining reimbursement of their losses through collecting
on a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure, even in states that allow such
deficiency judgments. The unfavorable prospects presented by this default
situation would encourage the mortgage holders to instruct their loan servicers
to attempt to negotiate sufficient principal reductions to forestall such a
strategic default.
11. Id. at 6 (calculating that the strategic default rate among underwater
homeowners was only about 3% as of the end of the second quarter of 2009, less
than one-tenth of the 32% of homeowners that had underwater mortgages at
that time). However, over 20% of loans to underwater homeowners are
currently sixty to eighty-nine days delinquent, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 26

(Comm. Print 2009), indicating that a number of those underwater borrowers
had also experienced job losses, divorces, or other financial difficulties that
compromised their ability to make their mortgage payments. See White, supra
note 2, at 5. It has been estimated that about 26% of current mortgage defaults
are strategic defaults by persons who have the financial capability to continue
making their payments. Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification
Approach to the Housing Crisis, 11 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 575, 580 (2009)
(citing to several studies).
CONG.,
111TH
PANEL,
OVERSIGHT
CONGRESSIONAL
12. See
FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 29 (Comm. Print
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change dramatically in short order. In particular, if housing
prices should continue to broadly decline over the next few
years, at even a modest rate, a sudden and rapid cascade of
millions of additional mortgage defaults and subsequent
foreclosures could erupt. These new defaults, unlike most
mortgage defaults in recent years, would not stem primarily
from the resetting of the low initial interest rates on variable
rate subprime and Alt-A mortgages in a falling home price
environment that makes loan refinancing difficult or
impossible for many such borrowers. Nor would they stem
from the unemployment consequences of the recent recession
These defaults would instead be
and its aftermath.
voluntary, strategic defaults by those underwater
homeowners who are still financially capable of meeting their
current mortgage obligations, but now recognize that it is not
in their best interest to do so, and whose loan servicers are
unwilling to make substantial reductions in their loan
balances so as to avoid the need for those persons to default
and go through foreclosure. Such a cascade of new defaults
and foreclosures would obviously have the potential to put
additional strong downward pressure on housing prices,13 and
to further burden local government budgets.14 This could
lead to a spiral of even more strategic defaults as yet more
2009) (footnote omitted).
Given the slim prospects of the housing market recovering to 20052007 price levels in the near future, some [currently underwater]
homeowners might begin to question whether they will ever have
positive equity in their homes.
... [T]here may be a point at which they begin to consider abandoning
the house and finding an equivalent (but cheaper) rental property,
resulting in a foreclosure on the house.... If even a small percentage of
those with negative equity .

. .

abandon their homes, foreclosure rates

will remain greatly elevated.
Id. See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE
THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (Bay Back Books 2002) (discussing the
general concept that in certain situations a seemingly small change in an
important factor can lead to unforeseen, large, and geometrically cascading
behavioral changes).
13. "A single foreclosure can depress [each of] the eighty closest neighbors'
property values by nearly $5,000. When multiple foreclosures happen on a
CONGRESSIONAL
block or in a neighborhood, the effect is exponential."
OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A

SOLUTION 9 (Comm. Print 2009) (footnote omitted).
14. "Foreclosed properties also impose significant direct costs on local
governments and foster crime. A single foreclosure can cost a city over
$34,000." Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
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homeowners face substantial and growing underwater
positions, with obvious adverse consequences for the many
financial institutions, for other investors who hold interests
in those mortgages, and also for broader macroeconomic
recovery efforts.
The current unstable situation where the large majority
of underwater homeowners continue to make their mortgage
payments, despite this often not being in their best interests,
is the result of three contributing factors that I will discuss in
some detail below. First, for various reasons that I will
discuss in Part II of this article, it is difficult for even those
underwater homeowners with significant negative equity
positions to recognize that their financial interests would be
better served by defaulting on their mortgages, or by at least
threatening to default unless their principal balances are
modified downward by their mortgage loan servicer much
closer to the home's current value.' 5 Having failed to conduct
the required financial calculations showing the relative
advantages of default, or having done so but then being
emotionally unable to accept and act upon their implications,
most of those homeowners continue for now to dutifully make
their mortgage payments even though it is often not
economically rational for them to do so.
Second, in Part III, I will discuss the reasons why
mortgage loan servicers are quite reluctant to significantly
modify mortgages so as to substantially reduce outstanding
principal balances for those underwater homeowners who do
have the means to continue making their payments, even if
those persons credibly threaten to default if such loan
modifications are not forthcoming.16 This reluctance is in
contrast to servicers' far greater willingness to engage in
more modest loan modifications that do not reduce the loan
principal balance-and may even increase it by rolling in any
accumulated arrearages. These loan modifications usually
only lower the interest rate or extend the time period of the
loan, and are only usually made for those homeowners,
underwater or otherwise, who are in some financial distress
and are having trouble meeting their monthly payment
obligations (hereinafter referred to as "troubled borrowers").
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
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As I will discuss in Part IV, the federal government has
placed its bets almost exclusively on the hope of being able to
help foster a sustained recovery of housing prices back
towards their 2006-2007 peaks, and has largely limited the
scope of its mortgage assistance programs to assisting
troubled borrowers who cannot meet their current mortgage
payments. 17 The government has not made any serious
efforts to assist those many underwater homeowners who are
capable of continuing to meet their payment obligations in
understanding and weighing the potential economic benefits
and the risks of default, or to advise them how to most
effectively pressure their loan servicers to agree to principalIf anything, the federal
reducing loan modifications.
debt
exhortations
encouraging
government's
moral
repayment have contributed to the psychological difficulties
that underwater homeowners face in rationally determining
where their interests lie and then taking suitable action. Nor
has the government made available the many billions of
dollars of financial support that would be necessary to
significantly ameliorate the financial consequences of the
widespread and substantial reductions of the principal
balances of the mortgages of underwater homeowners for the
financial institutions and other investors who directly or
indirectly hold those mortgages, so as to encourage such
modifications and thus reduce the possibility of a sudden and
substantial increase in foreclosure rates resulting from a
wave of strategic defaults.
In Part V of this article, I will set forth my thoughts on
how this dangerous economic situation might be better
addressed through measures designed to lead to loan
principal modifications taking place on a very large scale
before the current foreclosure crisis suddenly takes a turn for
the worse.1 8 I will offer a relatively inexpensive plan of public
information and education that is intended to assist
underwater homeowners in accurately assessing their
financial circumstances, and then to encourage them, when
appropriate, to effectively demand principal-reducing
I will also
modifications from their loan servicers.
recommend that this public education program be
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
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accompanied by a few federal statutory enactments that are
each intended to limit the adverse consequences of foreclosure
for borrowers, and by federal legislation that would protect
loan servicers who engaged in principal-reducing loan
modifications from litigation initiated by mortgage investors
who are unhappy with those loan modifications, and by more
aggressive federal enforcement efforts designed to assure that
loan servicers properly discharge their fiduciary duties to
their mortgage investors to maximize their returns. I believe
that this combination of efforts would lead to principalreducing modifications of the loans of millions of underwater
homeowners, and thus avoid the possibility of our having to
endure another cascade of defaults and foreclosures and the
resulting macroeconomic dislocations. My proposal also has
the advantages of not requiring any large-scale, multi-billion
dollar taxpayer bailouts of underwater homeowners or
mortgage investors, nor would it require any amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code that would expand judicial authority to
discharge residential mortgage obligations. It thus finesses
two major areas of political controversy that would each
probably doom at the outset any attempt to address this
problem.
Part
VI
describes
and
then
compares
my
recommendations to another recent and interesting proposal
for addressing the problem of underwater homeowners that
has been developed by Professors Eric Posner and Luigi
Zingales of the University of Chicago, two prominent
commentators in this area."
Their approach calls for
amending Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code to allow for a
streamlined mortgage principal reduction and shared
appreciation procedure that would be made available to those
underwater homeowners living in postal ZIP Code areas that
have recently experienced at least a 20% decline in median
house prices.2 0
The Posner and Zingales proposal differs substantially
from my recommendations in a number of ways, as discussed
below. Their proposal is similar to mine in one key regard, in
that it also does not require a taxpayer-financed, multi-billion
dollar bailout of underwater homeowners and mortgage
19. See infra Part IV. See generally Posner & Zingales, supra note 11.
20. Posner & Zingales, supra note 11.
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investors. I believe that my approach would prove somewhat
easier to implement politically than would the Posner and
Zingales proposal, although both proposals would certainly
encounter significant opposition from creditor interests. I
also believe that my approach would be more likely to succeed
in resolving the negative equity problem. Additionally, my
proposal would also result in loan modifications that would
arguably provide for a fairer allocation between mortgage
creditors and underwater homeowners of the very large losses
stemming from recent housing price declines than would their
approach, which in my opinion unduly and unnecessarily
favors creditors over borrowers. I do, however, recognize that
reasonable persons could disagree here regarding the relative
distributive justice merits of the two proposals.
The Posner and Zingales proposal would clearly be an
improvement over the existing status quo. Yet their approach
has some inherent limitations that I believe would make it
much less effective than my recommendations in
fundamentally resolving the negative equity problem. The
central problem is that their approach is hamstrung by their
explicit underlying premise that it would somehow be
immoral for those underwater homeowners who are
financially capable of continuing to make their payments to
act on the recognition that, in many instances, their interests
would be best served by strategically defaulting on their
loans, and thus forcing their loan servicers to choose between
offering them very substantial loan modifications or pursuing
foreclosure. According to their argument, it would therefore
be bad public policy for the government and others to attempt
to encourage and assist underwater homeowners to
strategically default when this is their most effective course
of action. I disagree with this premise, and my approach
instead embraces the idea that public policy should encourage
and assist underwater homeowners to rationally assess where
their best interests lie, and to act accordingly, even if this
leads to large numbers of threatened strategic defaults. As
discussed below, such a situation is more likely to result in
large numbers of principal-reducing loan modifications than
in a wave of foreclosures.
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II. WHY UNDERWATER HOMEOWNERS DO NOT
DEFAULT MORE OFTEN
The relatively low rates of strategic default by even
significantly underwater homeowners are somewhat puzzling
and merit a closer analysis. In a recent and insightful article,
Professor Brent White of the University of Arizona analyzed
in some detail why such a large proportion of those
underwater homeowners who have the financial capability to
make their mortgage payments, but who have significant
negative equity positions and whose interests would often be
better served by defaulting, continue to make those
payments.2 1 Let me summarize below and comment upon the
thrust of his arguments.
White recognizes that part of the reason for this behavior
is that the financial calculations that are required for one to
accurately assess the relative merits of defaulting on a
mortgage versus continuing to make the payments are
relatively complex. These calculations involve not only a
number of cash flow variables but also include many hard-tovalue factors such as deficiency judgment risk, tax liability
exposure, and the disruption and inconvenience associated
with changing residences.2 2 The inherently difficult process
of conducting such a multi-variable mathematical calculation
is made even harder by various cognitive biases that people
21. See generally White, supra note 2. This article is likely to be both
influential and insightful, as is demonstrated by the 38,896 abstract views and
the 12,131 downloads that its SSRN posting has received as of June 29, 2010.
In his more recent work, White attempts to shed further light on the various
social problems and moral questions presented by strategic defaults by
underwater homeowners. See generally Brent T. White, Take this House and
Shove It: The Emotional Drivers of Strategic Default (Arizona Legal Studies,
Discussion Paper No. 10-17, 2010); Brent T. White, The Morality of Strategic
Default (Arizona Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 10-15, 2010).
22. White, supra note 2, at 7-13. These financial calculations involve the
many costs of continued homeowning, including the loan payments, property
taxes and maintenance and insurance, minus any expected appreciation above
the final mortgage balance due at sale and any tax savings over the planned
period of ownership. The financial calculations then compare these costs to the
transitional costs of moving to a rental property and the costs of renting. Id.
They also involve quantifying the financial risk, if any, of being held liable for a
deficiency judgment pursuant to a foreclosure proceeding, the risk of any
adverse tax consequences that may result from an unpaid mortgage balance,
the burden of any adverse impacts of a foreclosure for a period of time upon
one's credit rating, and any disruptions inherent in moving to a different
residence. Id.
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are prone to in this context,23 such as the status quo bias,
myopia, selective perception, and overconfidence. Each bias
an objective weighing of these various
impedes
considerations.14 However, White convincingly demonstrates
that these calculations, even if done in a rather crude and
approximate fashion, clearly reveal the relatively large net
benefits of default for most significantly underwater
The primary impediment to rational
homeowners.2 5
of their
homeowners
by
underwater
assessment
than
emotional
more
view,
in
White's
circumstances is,
cognitive; it is the feelings of fear and shame and guilt that
are often triggered by the prospect of mortgage default and
foreclosure.
White's article provides considerable support for his
claim that most underwater homeowners view the prospect of
default with such strong negative feelings that they would not
even consider a strategic default if they are at all capable of
continuing their payments. 27 He also describes in some detail
how these negative emotions are strongly and effectively
reinforced by many if not all of our social institutions,2 8 which
23. Id. at 14-15.
24. Id. at 13-16. The "status quo bias" would tend to bias underwater
homeowners to favor continuing to make their mortgage payments rather than
to default and start a process of major change in their lives. Id. at 15. The
"myopia" bias would tend to bias homeowners to overvalue up-front costs and
undervalue long-term gains. Id. The "selective perception" bias would bias
underwater homeowners against recognizing that the prices of comparable
homes sold in their neighborhood suggest a steep fall in their home's value. Id.
The "overoptimism" bias would incline underwater homeowners to embrace
unrealistic expectations of the prospects of a strong recovery in home prices. Id.
25. Id. at 12-13.
26. Id. at 16-18. "As a large body of work in the neurosciences has
revealed, much of what passes for cognitive bias is actually emotional bias,
reached with no cognitive process whatsoever." Id. at 16-17 (footnote omitted).
27. See id. at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
[Tihe term commonly used to describe foreclosure by those who face it
is "terrifying."
As one commentator on foreclosure has noted,
"foreclosure is the terrifying word no homeowner wants to hear, let
alone experience." People not only fear losing their homes, but fear
having ruined credit for life, not be able to find a decent place to live, to
buy a car, to get a credit card, to get insurance, to ever buy a house, or
even get a job. Foreclosure is seen as the end of life as one knows it:
financial suicide to be avoided at all costs. In short, fear-like shame
and guilt-is a powerful motivator in homeowner decisions not to
default.
Id. See alsogenerally id. at 16-23.
28. "[Tlhe predominant message of political, social and economic
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together broadcast the general message that one has a moral
responsibility to pay one's mortgage. 29 However, this moral
exhortation delivered by the federal government, the media,
credit counseling agencies, and our other major economic and
political actors routinely ignores the fact that there is a huge
financial upside to strategic default for those underwater
homeowners with significant negative equity positions. The
true risks and burdens associated with possible deficiency
judgments, potential tax liability on the unpaid portions of
mortgage balances, and subsequent credit score impairment
are all far less severe than are commonly represented.3 0
Underwater homeowners are systematically discouraged from
regarding mortgage default as simply the exercise of the inthe-money "put option" rights that they are effectively
entitled to under the terms of their loan agreement, 31 a
institutions in the United States has functioned to cultivate fear, shame, and
guilt in those who might contemplate foreclosure." White, supra note 2, at 25.
Typical of such criticism [of defaulting mortgagors] is that of [former]
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, who declared . . . "any

homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to walk
away from an underwater property is simply a speculator-and one
who is not honoring his obligations."
. . . Such individuals are portrayed [by the media] as obscene,
offensive, and unethical, and likened to deadbeat dads who walk out on
their children, or those who would have "given up" and just handed
over Europe to the Nazis.
Id. at 26 (footnotes omitted).
29. Id. at 25.
30. Id. at 32-35. Some states are "non-recourse" jurisdictions that do not
allow mortgage lenders to pursue defaulting mortgagors for deficiency
judgments. Even where this is permitted, lenders usually do not attempt to do
so. Id. at 12-13, 33, 33 n.144-45. In addition, the federal tax laws have
recently changed to waive tax liability on the unpaid portion of a mortgage upon
foreclosure, id. at 13, although it should be recognized that under some
circumstances, homeowners may have some tax liability after a foreclosure.
This liability arises primarily (although not exclusively) when they have
engaged in a cash-out refinancing of the property, or have taken out a home
equity loan, and then have spent the loan proceeds in a manner other than
improving the property. In addition, in some states, including California,
homeowners are legally liable for paying state income taxes on forgiven
mortgage debt. See generally Les Christie, Foreclosed? Here Comes the Tax
Man,
CNNMONEY,
Apr.
14,
2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/08/pfltaxes-mortgage-debt/index.htm (discussing
these potential sources of tax liability). Finally, while going through foreclosure
has an immediate and significant negative impact on one's credit rating, most
people can expect to fully recover from the negative impact of a foreclosure on
their credit score within a two-year period. White, supra note 2, at 11-12.
31. An example of such an anti-default orientation with regard to
underwater borrowers is the views expressed by the Congressional Oversight
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course of action that in White's opinion should be evaluated
in those dispassionate terms.3 2
White is highly critical of this social moralizing effort
that reinforces the emotional aversions of underwater
homeowners to rationally calculating where their true
interests lie," given that mortgage lenders and loan servicers
are generally under no such cognitive or emotional
impediments that impede their clear-eyed pursuit of their
own financial interests.3 ' He calls forcefully for "leveling the
playing field"35 between homeowners and their mortgage
lenders with regard to loan renegotiations by reducing the
effect of these "norm asym etries" 36 upon those
negotiations. 37 However, he then stops short of endorsing a
sweeping public education and assistance campaign designed
to educate underwater homeowners as to the true nature of
their options and to encourage them to pressure their
mortgage servicers for meaningful principal reductions,3 a
stance that while perhaps prudent in terms of avoiding
controversy is somewhat surprising in light of the powerful
critique he has developed. He does call for the federally
Panel in 2009. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG.,
FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 29 (Comm. Print 2009)
("Incentives may be needed to encourage borrowers with negative equity to
adopt a long-term view and to remain in their homes whenever possible.").
32. White, supra note 2, at 40.
33. White does not, however, go so far as to claim that there is a consciously
coordinated effort to so manipulate the emotions of homeowners. "This is not to
say that there is a grand scheme to manipulate the emotions of homeowners, or
even that the government and other institutions consciously cultivate these
emotional constraints on default." Id. at 25 (footnote omitted). But he does
claim that the cultivation of fear, shame, and guilt in those who might
contemplate foreclosure is the "predominate message" sent by our leading social
institutions, id., and that this needs to be changed. "Regardless of the precise
policy prescription, it is time to put to rest the assumption that a borrower who
exercises the option to default is somehow immoral or irresponsible." Id. at 53.
34. "[N]orms governing homeowner behavior stand in sharp contrast to
norms governing lenders, who seek to maximize profits or minimize losses
irrespective of concerns of morality or social responsibility." Id. (quoting the
abstract). See also generally id. at 35-40.
35. Id. at 41.
36. Id.

at 40.

"Such 'norm asymmetry'

.

.

.

has led to distributional

inequalities in which individual homeowners shoulder a disproportionate
burden from the housing collapse." Id. (quoting the abstract).
37. Id. at 47 n.217.
38. Such an approach "would likely be so distasteful to most policy makers,
and many readers of this article, that this idea will not be pursued further
here." White, supra note 2, at 44.
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approved and financially supported housing and credit
counseling agencies to at least cease sending the message to
homeowners that foreclosure should be avoided at all costs.
Further, those agencies should begin to provide homeowners
with more accurate information regarding their very limited
deficiency judgment exposure risk, the rather narrow
contours of their tax liability risk, and the usually rather
modest and relatively short-term credit score implications of
a foreclosure. 9 White briefly notes, and in a couple of
instances critiques, some other recent proposals that have
been made with regard to the problem of underwater
homeowners,4 0 and then sets forth in some detail a proposed
amendment to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act that
would prevent lenders from reporting mortgage defaults and
foreclosures to the credit rating agencies. 4 1 He also calls for
adoption of what he labels a "national anti-deficiency statute"
that would bar lenders from pursuing homeowners for the
unsatisfied portion of a mortgage obligation after foreclosure
in those states that now permit this.4 2
39. Id. at 45.
40. White specifically, but only briefly, critically discusses a recent proposal
made by Adam Levitin regarding expanded powers for bankruptcy judges to
write down the principal of mortgage debts on primary residences. White also
discusses a recent proposal offered by Eric Posner and Luigi Zingales, which I
will extensively discuss in Part VI, that would allow prepackaged mortgage
writedowns under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code for homeowners who live
in postal ZIP code areas that have experienced at least a 20% decline in median
home prices. Id. at 42-44; see infra Part VI; see generally Adam Levitin,
Resolving the ForeclosureCrisis:Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009
WIs. L. REV. 565 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071931; Posner
& Zingales, supra note 11. White also briefly notes, without discussion,
proposals made by Rebel A. Cole and Christopher L. Foote that each call for the
use of federal government stimulus funds to cover homeowner negative equity
positions. White, supra note 2, at 43 n.198, 52 n.231. See generally Rebel A.
Cole, The Housing-Asset Relief Program:A Planfor Stabilizing the Housing and
Securities
Markets
(Apr.
22,
2009)
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1338883;
Christopher L.
Foote et. al., A Proposal to Help Distressed Homeowners: A Government
Payment-Sharing Plan (FRB of Boston Public Policy Brief No. 09-1, 2009),
availableat httpI/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1432514.
41. White, supra note 2, at 45-52.
42. Id. at 46 n.212, 53 n.232. White unfortunately does not elaborate upon
this novel and interesting proposal. In particular, he does not discuss how one
might address potential constitutional challenges to the retroactive application
of such a statute to existing mortgages that would obviously be necessary for a
statute to meaningfully contribute to any resolution of the current underwater
homeowner problem.
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Professor White is very convincing in his argument that
the current behavior of underwater homeowners with
significant negative equity positions who continue to make
their payments is based more upon the cognitive and
emotional limitations they are subject to than upon a rational
calculation of their self-interest, although he gives
insufficient weight to the complexity of the required
calculations and to the cognitive impediments influencing
these calculations, as relative to the great weight he accords
the emotional aspects of the default decision. One may or
may not agree with his position that we should reduce the
widespread public moralizing that serves to reinforce the
negative emotions that homeowners feel about the prospects
of foreclosure. Instead, White argues that we should attempt
to provide those homeowners with accurate information and
other support for making rational calculations as to where
their true interests lie so that they are able to negotiate on a
more even playing field with their bottom line-driven lenders
I
for meaningful modifications of their obligations.4 3
personally agree with White on this matter. But apart from
this point of agreement, the main purpose of this article is to
demonstrate that the current situation is indeed unstable and
dangerous if Professor White is correct that the low strategic
default rates for underwater homeowners do rest primarily
upon cognitive limitations and the emotional factors of fear,
guilt, and shame, rather than upon rational calculations of
self-interest.
If in the next few years there is a significant increase in
the number of underwater homeowners who strategically
default, and if the substantial financial gains for those
persons choosing this course of action are then wellpublicized, as would be likely, this publicity would serve to
reduce the social stigma of foreclosure and the intensity of
negative emotions associated with its prospect. The behavior
of the millions of underwater homeowners with significant
negative equity positions could then change on a large scale
in a very sudden, geometrically cascading fashion." This
43. White, supra note 2, at 44.
44. "[Pleople who know someone who has strategically defaulted are 82%
more likely to declare their intention to do so." Id. at 19 (citing as support for
this claim Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Moral and Social
Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
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change would probably occur before any effective
governmental policy could be put into place that would
forestall this new wave of defaults, or at least channel it into
principal-reducing
loan
modifications
rather
than
foreclosures. Given this very real tipping point possibility, it
would be prudent for policymakers to attempt to resolve the
problem posed by the many millions of underwater
homeowners through some more fundamental measures that
address the underlying negative equity situation. We need to
encourage the making of substantial loan modifications on a
large scale, so as to entirely eliminate the looming risk of a
new wave of foreclosures, rather than simply trying to hold
back that wave by continuing to reinforce the current fearful
and guilt-ridden emotional attitudes of homeowners towards
the prospect of default and foreclosure.
III. WHY LOAN SERVICERS DO NOT RENEGOTIATE
THE MORTGAGE LOANS OF UNDERWATER
HOMEOWNERS MORE OFTEN AND MORE
SUBSTANTIALLY
It is well documented that mortgage loan servicers have
been very reluctant to renegotiate mortgages in any fashion
since the current foreclosure crisis started in 2007.45 A recent
Research, Working Paper No. 15145, 2009).
45. Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul Willen, Why Don't Lenders
RenegotiateMore Home Mortgages?Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization, 1
(FRB of Boston Pub. Policy Discussion Paper No. 09-4, 2009). "[Mlany banks
appear to have a policy of either not renegotiating loans or doing so only in
unusual circumstances." Posner & Zingales, supra note 11, at 577.
On March 24, 2010, the Bank of America announced a new loan
modification program that allowed for substantial loan principal reductions over
a period of time, and thus appeared at first glance to address to a greater extent
the problems posed by underwater homeowners than any prior efforts by large
loan servicers. However, that program was only made available to the
approximately 45,000 homeowners serviced by Bank of America whose loans
had been originated by Countrywide Financial prior to that firm's 2008
acquisition by Bank of America, representing less than 5% of the persons in
default whose mortgages Bank of America was servicing. For eligibility, the
program also required that the homeowner demonstrated that he had suffered
some financial loss of income. David Streitfeld & Louise Story, Bank ofAmerica
to Help DistressedHomeowners, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 25, 2010, at Bl. It therefore
appeared that this concession, made in the face of significant legal pressure
from the State of Massachusetts, id., did not address the core problem
addressed in this paper of solvent underwater homeowners who have the ability
to continue making their mortgage payments, but who may at some point
strategically default.
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study reveals that as of July 2009, loan servicers had entered
into "concessionary" loan modifications on only about 3% of a
large random sample of seriously delinquent mortgage loans
within the first year following an initial serious
This reluctance presents somewhat of a
delinquency.4 6
puzzle, since it is obvious that a principal-reducing loan
modification, keeping the borrower in the house and making
payments under the modified mortgage, will generally be an
economically preferable outcome for both the borrower and
the lender as compared to a default and a subsequent
foreclosure sale. 7 This puzzle is made more disturbing by
the fact that foreclosures are an economically inefficient
outcome relative to loan modifications, not only for the
affected borrowers and lenders, but also for society at large
once the significant negative external impacts upon other
persons and various governmental bodies are also
considered.48
There is a plethora of competing (and to some extent also
complementary) explanations that have been offered for this
servicer reluctance to modify loans. First, I will briefly
summarize these numerous general explanations, and then I
will discuss the extent to which each of those explanations
shed specific light on servicer reluctance to agree to principalreducing loan modifications for underwater homeowners with
significant negative equity positions that would substantially
reduce or even eliminate that negative equity.
The leading and probably the most commonly articulated
explanation for the low rates of renegotiation of delinquent
mortgages is that the subsequent securitization and resecuritization of many mortgage loans in recent years has
created many indirect claimants to the payments made on a
given mortgage.4 9 This has made it much more difficult to
46. Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 45, at 3. "Concessionary"
modifications were defined in this study to include only those modifications that
reduced a borrower's monthly payment, such as reductions in the principal
balance or interest rate, or an extension of the loan term, id. at 2-3. The
definition did not include those loan modifications that simply capitalized
arrearages into the balance of the outstanding loan and thus led to increased
payments. Id.
47. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE
CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 6 (Comm. Print 2009).
48. Id. at 10.
49. Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 45, at 4.
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consummate loan renegotiations that satisfy all of the
numerous parties involved. The rights of these indirect
claimants are derived from their ownership of an interest in
one or another prioritized tranche of a mortgage-backed
security that includes that mortgage in its mortgage pool that
generates the security's cash flow stream. Consequently,
these claimants often have different priority rights among
themselves to those mortgage payments. In some instances
these rights may be even more indirectly derived from the
ownership of one or another prioritized tranche of a
collateralized debt obligation, which is in turn secured
partially by an interest in a tranche of that mortgage-backed
security, again with different priority rights among
themselves to the payments received by the collateralized
debt obligation from the securities that secure that
obligation.s0

Given this often very complex structure of indirect claims
with different priorities to the payments on a given mortgage,
it is said by some to be difficult or impossible for loan
servicers to arrange for loan modifications that will satisfy all
of these different claimants and avoid the risk of subsequent
litigation calling into question the prudence of the
The servicers are claimed to be legally
modifications."
unable to engage in collectively wealth-preserving
modifications because of this "tranche warfare,"52 particularly
50. There exist even more indirect interests based upon ownership interests
in a tranche of a collateralized debt obligation that is itself based upon a pool of
interests in tranches of other collateralized debt obligations, interests that are
sometimes referred to as "collateralized debt obligations squared." I have even
seen references to interests in "collateralized debt obligations cubed," involving
yet another level of pooling and tranching existing "collateralized debt
obligations squared"-type securities to back newly issued securities. See
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS:
WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 43 (Comm. Print 2009).
51. See Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View (Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 24-25, 2009) ("Servicers were unclear as to their
legal ability to modify loans within securitization trusts. . . . "); Posner &
Zingales, supra note 11, at 578 ("[Wlhen loan servicers do renegotiate loans,
they face the risk of lawsuits from MBS holders who claim that the loan servicer
was too generous to the homeowner .

. .

. [Sleriously delinquent mortgages

controlled by servicers of securitizations enter foreclosure much more quickly
than portfolio loans."); id. at 600 (stating that servicers of securitized loans are
claimed to face a "huge liability risk" if they renegotiate them); Christopher
Mayer, Edward Morrison & Thomasz Piskorski, A New Proposal for Loan
Modifications, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 417-20 (2009).
52. Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 45, at 4 (citing Kurt Eggert,
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given that a high proportion of recent mortgages are also
accompanied by junior second mortgages on the property.
These second mortgages must also be dealt with in any
renegotiation effort, and problems can arise where the
interests of junior mortgage holders often conflict to some
extent with those of the holders of the senior mortgage with
regard to the terms of a renegotiation.5 4
While this oft-repeated explanation of mortgage servicer
reluctance to renegotiate loans as being grounded in the
difficulties presented by the conflicting interests of the
persons they directly or indirectly represent is facially
plausible, not everyone accepts it as the-or even a-central
cause of the problem. For example, some observers who have
conducted empirical studies comparing the renegotiation
rates between securitized mortgages and those mortgages
that continue to be held and serviced by their originators
have expressed doubts about whether securitization has
actually had an adverse impact on loan renegotiation rates."
Comment, What Prevents Loan Modifications, 18 Housing Policy Debate No. 2

at
available
(2007)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1081479). Many holders of
mortgage-backed securities would have no incentive to support a modification;
the holders of the out-of-the-money junior tranches would generally not benefit
from a modification, nor would the most senior tranches that have a substantial
enough cushion of more junior tranches to guarantee their payments.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS:
WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 43 (Comm. Print 2009).
53. Some of these mortgages were originated simultaneously with the senior
mortgage, often without the knowledge of the senior mortgagee, and others
CONGRESSIONAL
were later taken out as home equity lines of credit.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A
SOLUTION 40 (Comm. Print 2009).
54. Id. at 40, 43; see Swagel, supra note 51, at 24
[T]he presence of a second lien . . . could present a challenge to a

modification on the primary mortgage, since owners of second liens had
an incentive to hold up the process unless they received a payoff-this
even though a second lien on a troubled borrower was worth only
pennies on the dollar ....
Id. Mayer, Morrison & Piskorski, supra note 51, at 419.
55. Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 45, at 4-5
Our empirical analysis provides strong evidence against the role of
securitization in preventing renegotiation. . . . [Tihe differences in the
likelihood of renegotiation . .. between [securitized mortgage loans and
mortgage loans owned by the loan servicers] is neither economically
nor statistically significant.
. .'.

Our results are highly robust.

Id. See also J. P. Hunt, What do Subprime Securitization Contracts Actually
Say about Loan Modification? (Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the
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This doubt persists despite sometimes seeming impediments
to renegotiations incorporated in the securities' governing
documents."
The truth here may well be that mortgage
securitization and the presence of junior mortgages have not
so far been the major obstacle that is impeding
renegotiations, but they may prove to be more of a problem if
efforts to engage in larger numbers of modifications that
significantly reduce principal balances for underwater
homeowners are attempted."
Another common explanation for the low renegotiation
rates is that the contract terms under which mortgage
servicers are reimbursed for their expenses often provide
perverse financial incentives for them to foreclose on a loan
rather than to modify it,6" even though, in most instances,
less value will ultimately be realized for the direct or indirect
holders of the mortgage by foreclosure than by renegotiation
of even quite substantial loan principal reductions. 9
Economy, Working Paper, 2009) (concluding after an "exhaustive review" of a
sample of pooling and servicing agreements governing the conduct of servicers
of securitized home loans that "it appears that large-scale modification
programs may be undertaken without violating the plain terms of PSA's in most
cases.") (cited in Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 45, at 4).
56. "[S]ome PSA's contain additional restrictions that can hamper servicers'
ability to modify mortgages. Sometimes the modification is forbidden outright,
sometimes only interest rates can be adjusted, not principal, and sometimes
there are limitations on the amount by which interest rates can be adjusted.
[Other limitations also exist]." CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH
CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 42 (Comm. Print
2009). However, the Congressional Oversight Panel also noted that "it is
important not to overstate" the significance of PSA limitations on renegotiation
efforts, and that it "knows of no litigation against mortgage servicers for
engaging in modifications that violate the terms of PSAs." Id. at 44; see id. at
46-47; cf Mayer, Morrison & Piskorski, supra note 51, at 418.
57. "Restrictive PSA's do not appear to be the main immediate obstacle to
loan modifications, but they present a significant limitation on expanded
modification efforts."
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG.,
FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 44 (Comm. Print 2009).
58. "[M]ortgage servicer compensation structures can create a situation in
which foreclosure is more profitable to servicers than loan modification, even if
it imposes bigger losses on both the homeowners and the investors." Id. at 4445; see id. at 45-47 for a more detailed discussion of these compensation
structures.
59. Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 45, at 4. When both the costs of a
foreclosure proceeding and the sub-market prices that foreclosure sales usually
bring are considered, mortgage lenders lose, on average, $60,000 in a
foreclosure sale relative to the market value of the property. CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A
SOLUTION 9 (Comm. Print 2009). "[Floreclosed properties lose a substantial
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Mortgage servicer compensation for managing performing
loans is typically determined on a fixed-price basis, with the
fixed payments reduced if a loan's principal balance or
interest rate is modified downward. But their foreclosure
efforts are typically compensated on a more generous costplus basis, "with no oversight of either the costs or plus
components.""o It is also often noted that mortgage servicers
never envisioned having to modify a large proportion of their
loans, a much more complex and judgmental process than is
simply collecting and forwarding mortgage payments.
Servicers as a result now face a severe shortage of the
qualified staff needed to carry out such modifications.'
Yet another explanation often given relates to the
accounting implications of loan modifications for the financial
institutions and others that hold an interest in those loans. If
mortgages or mortgage-backed securities are being valued
internally by their holders at par or close to par, they may
then be reluctant to renegotiate those mortgage loans because
such renegotiations would require that the assets supported
by those loans would then have to be written down to reflect
the renegotiated value of the loans, possibly revealing serious
financial difficulties for their holders.6 2 Another accounting
treatment related basis claimed for the reluctance of those
mortgage lenders who continue to hold and service the loans
that they have originated to enter into loan modifications is
that, historically, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") rules have stated that contacting a borrower who is
fewer than sixty days delinquent in their payments may
constitute an "ongoing relationship" with that borrower that
may jeopardize the right to preferentially treat that loan as
an off-balance sheet asset.6 3 However, the SEC later ruled in
2008 that if default was "reasonably foreseeable," then
contact with a borrower prior to the sixty-day delinquency
would not affect the accounting status of the loan.64 In the
fraction of their value, about 30%." Posner & Zingales, supra note 11, at 576.
60. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE
CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 46 (Comm. Print 2009).
61. Id. at 6, 40, 47-48; see also Swagel, supra note 51, at 16.
62. Id. at 30.
63. Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 45, at 4.
64. Id. See also Swagel, supra note 51, at 24-25
Servicers ... worried that undertaking too many modifications would
lead to an adverse change in the accounting treatment of the MBSs
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same vein, accounting rules that require banks acting as such
lenders to identify loan modifications as "troubled debt
restructurings," thereby reducing their amount of crucial
regulatory Tier II capital, may also serve as an impediment to
some renegotiations.s
Some observers have argued that the primary factors
underlying mortgage servicer reluctance to modify delinquent
mortgages are more what one might call the "self-cure" risk
and the "redefault" risk that are each associated with loan
modifications. 6 The self-cure risk is based upon the fact that
historically a substantial fraction of seriously delinquent
borrowers will eventually fully cure their deficiency without
receiving a loan modification.67 For those borrowers, any
concessions made in a loan modification would be money
wasted from the point of view of the lender. In addition, large
proportions of the borrowers who receive loan modifications
quickly redefault, and within six months or less are again in
arrears on their new, modified obligations.6
For those
borrowers, the loan modification has simply postponed
default and eventual foreclosure, and if house prices have
fallen further during the period of modification the lender will
now recover even less from the foreclosure. In addition, a
borrower who redefaults may do little or nothing to maintain
the home during the period of modification before the
ultimate foreclosure sale takes place, again reducing the
lender's eventual recovery.
Some commentators have argued that mortgage servicers
are concerned about the possibility that, if they show too
much willingness to make concessions to troubled borrowers
and renegotiate loan terms that are more favorable to those
borrowers, this may lead to a dreaded "contagion effect" that
will encourage yet more homeowners who live in the same
geographical area to seek loan modifications themselves

containing the loans...
. The concern was that if too many loans were
modified, this would make the trust no longer a passive structure and
therefore ineligible for off-balance sheet treatment.
Id.
65. Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 45, at 6.
66. Id. at 7.
67. "[M]ore than 30% of seriously delinquent borrowers 'cure' without
receiving a modification." Id.
68. Id.
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rather than continue to make their payments."
A contagion effect occurs when homeowners learn from
their neighbors or from media sources of loan concessions
being made to others, and thereby see more clearly the
advantages of renegotiation and become less troubled by the
social stigma attached to defaulting or at least threatening to
default. The aggregate costs of the subsequent concessions
made to satisfy those additional homeowners who then come
forward seeking loan modifications will perhaps more than
outweigh the losses that would have resulted from refusing
the original requests for modifications and proceeding
through foreclosures instead, thus rendering the original
modifications uneconomic in light of those contagion
consequences. The servicers may thus believe that they will
do better by "holding the line" against all attempts by
homeowners who have the financial capacity to make their
payments rather than to renegotiate their loan obligations.
One knowledgeable commentator, Professor Phillip
Swagel of Georgetown University, who served as Assistant
Secretary for Economic Policy at the Department of the
Treasury from December 2006 to the end of the Bush
Administration in January 2009, has emphasized the
importance of servicer concerns regarding such a potential
contagion effect if they engage in concessionary modifications
for underwater but solvent homeowners.o Swagel claims
that (unnamed) mortgage servicers have told him that
because of "reputational considerations" they would "never"
write down the principal on a loan when the borrower had the
financial resources to make their mortgage payments.
Swagel states candidly that
[t]hey would rather take the loss in foreclosure when an
underwater borrower walked away than set a precedent
for writing down principal, and then have to take multiple
losses when entire neighborhoods of homeowners asked
for similar writedowns. We [at the Treasury] also realized
that the prospect of assistance could lead borrowers who
were not in difficulty to stop making payments in order to

69. "[W]idespread defaults reduce the social stigma of defaulting
Posner & Zingales, supra note 11, at 576.
70. Swagel, supra note 51, at 1.
71. Id. at 19.

. . .
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qualify for easier terms. 72
This contagion effect argument, explaining servicer
reluctance to modify the loans of borrowers who have the
financial capability to continue making their payments, has
some facial plausibility. But it is undermined to some extent
by the recognition that even if a substantial number of such
contagion-induced requests for loan modifications occur as a
result of a particular mortgage servicer entering into
significantly principal-reducing loan modifications, for most
servicers-those that are not the dominant servicers of home
mortgages in the various geographic communities in which
they operate-many if not most of any contagion-induced
requests for loan modification will probably be made of other
mortgage servicers by persons living in the same general
geographical area as the persons whose loans were modified.
Any adverse contagion effects stemming from loan
modifications will thus, for many servicers, be primarily
"external" costs that are imposed on other mortgage servicers
and the mortgage holders they represent, rather than being
borne directly by the servicer agreeing to the original
modifications and the mortgage holders they represent.73 The
quote above from Swagel, however, suggests that mortgage
servicers, rightly or wrongly, often regarded those contagion
costs as internal costs that they themselves would bear.
Finally, any concessionary loan modifications will entail
some "bailout eligibility risk." So long as the holders of
mortgages or mortgage-backed securities believe that there
may eventually be some form of a taxpayer-financed bailout
of borrowers who default, either through direct governmental
payments made to mortgage servicers on those borrowers'
behalf or otherwise, they will be reluctant to reduce even the
interest on those loans, let alone the principal balance.
Instead, loan servicers would rather await receipt of those
potential bailout payments than risk eligibility for any such

72. Id.
73. This "externality" observation must be qualified to the extent that
mortgage servicers feel and act upon a sort of "industry solidarity" with other
mortgage servicers that operate in the same geographical markets and the
mortgage holders they represent.
This solidarity serves to somehow
psychologically internalize the adverse financial impacts that contagion-induced
modifications arising from their loan modifications might impose upon other
servicers and their mortgage holders.
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bailout by engaging in concessionary loan modifications.7 4
The above-noted reasons why mortgage servicers may be
reluctant to renegotiate mortgages all presumably apply to
the renegotiation of mortgages of underwater (but solvent)
homeowners, as well as to the renegotiation of the mortgages
of troubled borrowers. However, some of those concerns are
perhaps less pressing in the underwater homeowner context,
while others likely take on particular importance in that
context.
The legal concerns presented by the modification of
securitized mortgages, and by the modification of mortgages
that are accompanied by junior mortgages, appear to be no
different in nature in the underwater homeowner context
than in other contexts. Nevertheless, the far larger sums
involved in principal-reducing modifications may well serve to
energize these concerns." Similarly, while the basic nature
of the problems presented by perverse servicer financial
incentives, inadequate staffing to handle modifications, and
disadvantageous accounting treatment of modifications are
much the same in all contexts, the relatively large principal
reductions that would have to be made when modifying the
loans of many underwater homeowners with significant
negative equity positions, so as to largely or completely
eliminate their negative equity, 6 would have particularly
burdensome consequences. The large principal reductions
would, first, lead to consequently large reductions in servicer
compensation under their typical fixed-price contracts with
the mortgage holders. In addition, such modifications would
obviously necessitate extra staff attention and expertise to
properly negotiate. Relatively large amounts of money would
be involved, and these modifications would, of course, have
far more significant accounting ramifications for the financial
positions of the mortgage and mortgage-backed securities
holders than would typical loan modifications for troubled
borrowers that only alter the interest rates or the length of
74. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE
CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 36-37 (Comm. Print 2009).
75. The aggregate amount of homeowner net equity has been estimated to
exceed $800 billion and perhaps may even exceed $1 trillion. See supra note 5
and accompanying text.
76. Many underwater borrowers have negative equity positions that may be
as large as several hundred thousand dollars or more. See White, supra note 2.
See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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the repayment period.
One factor that may contribute to servicer reluctance to
modify loans that will likely actually lessen in importance in
the context of principal-reducing modifications of the loans of
underwater homeowners that largely or completely eliminate
their negative equity position, perhaps dramatically, is the
risk that the borrowers will quickly redefault after the
Such principal-reducing modifications will
modification.
sharply reduce the amount of the monthly payments owed,
and will also give the homeowners some reasonable
expectations of building an equity position in the home that
will be put at risk upon redefault. The redefault risk on such
modifications is therefore likely to be negligible, in sharp
contrast to the current rather high redefault risk for troubled
borrower modifications that do not reduce the principal
balances and often also do not reduce monthly payments.
On the other hand, the large reductions in principal
balances that such modifications of the obligations of
underwater homeowners would entail would correspondingly
increase the amount of money lost, should such a borrower
who is considering (or even threatening) default elect to selfcure any deficiencies. The self-cure risk associated with such
principal-reducing modifications is thus likely much more of a
relevant factor to be considered than for other types of loan
modifications because of the much larger sums of money
involved. The risk of contagion effects would also appear to
loom far larger here than for other types of loan
modifications, since the losses that would result if such a
modification has contagion effects leading to further
principal-reducing modifications are also correspondingly
increased. Finally, such modifications would also result in
the formal recognition of correspondingly larger losses that
would now likely no longer qualify as a basis that could be
asserted for obtaining any payments from any potential
of
defaulting
bailout
taxpayer-finance
subsequent
homeowners. Thus, this type of modification would also
increase the bailout eligibility risk associated with such
modifications, as compared to other types of modifications.
IV. WHY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS NOT
HELPED TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM
The federal government, through the combination of its
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recent general economic stimulus programs," its tax credit
programs for homebuyers," and its massive interventions in
the markets for mortgage-backed securities through
guarantees and purchases by government-sponsored entities
and by the Federal Reserve System,79 has attempted to
broadly support housing prices through increasing the
demand for housing and reducing mortgage interest rates. A
broad and sustained increase in housing prices back towards
the former peak levels of 2006-2007 would of course largely
eliminate the homeowner negative equity situation, rendering
unnecessary any specific measures targeted at facilitating
principal-reducing loan modifications for underwater
homeowners. However, those combined intervention efforts
have not yet been successful in increasing housing prices,
although they may well have had some positive effects in
reducing the rate of price decline, and now in stabilizing those
prices. No sharp and sustained increases in housing prices
appear to be on the immediate horizon, and the problem of
massive negative equity,80 and the consequent potential for a
sudden spiraling cascade of millions of additional strategic
defaults and foreclosures, therefore remains.
The federal government's efforts to specifically address
the unique problems posed by the many millions of
underwater homeowners have, unfortunately, been minimal
at best. They have consisted primarily of moral exhortations
and appeals to the negative emotions of guilt, shame, and fear
commonly associated with the prospect of foreclosure, made
in an attempt to discourage strategic defaults, rather than
attempts to subsidize or otherwise encourage principalNone of the initiatives
reducing loan modifications.81
implemented during the later years of the Bush
Administration were at all effective in encouraging such
77. I refer here to the $700 billion Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5261. (2008), and the $787 billion American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 (codified in scattered sections

of U.S.C.).
78. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,

§

1006.
79. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, 111TH CONG., QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 109-26

(Comm. Print 2010).
80. See supra note 75.
81. See generally White, supra note 2, at 23-35.
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modifications."

The Obama Administration's Homeowner Affordability
and Stability Plan (hereinafter "HASP"), announced on
February 18, 2010, also does not deal effectively with the
problems impeding such modifications. HASP provides $75
billion in government funds to support government-sponsored
entity-guaranteed loan refinancings, loan modification efforts,
and additional reductions in mortgage interest rates."
However, the HASP provisions allowing for the refinancing of
those loans, while very attractive to eligible borrowers and
their servicers," only apply if the mortgage loan does not
exceed 105% of the property's current appraised value. This
requirement disqualifies almost all underwater homeowners
from participating, particularly those with significant
negative equity positions.15 In addition, the very modest
financial incentives HASP provides, in order to encourage
loan modifications," are unlikely to be sufficient. They will
82. See generally Swagel, supra note 51, at 13-30.
83. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, 111TH CONG., QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 96 (Comm.
Print 2010). See also CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG.,
FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 63-70 (Comm. Print

2009). The Obama Administration later provided more details about HASP,
labeling its efforts to achieve loan modifications under that program the "Home
Affordable Modification Program" ("HAMP"). This loan modification effort is
now more commonly referred to in the literature as the HAMP program rather
than as the HASP program. For a recent and critical assessment of the
operation of the HAMP program in its first year, see generally Jean Braucher,
Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster First
Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (Arizona Legal Studies,
Discussion Paper No. 09-37, 2010).
84. The loan interest rates to borrowers could be lowered to as low as a 2%
annual rate through government subsidies to the lenders. CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A
SOLUTION 64 (Comm. Print 2009).
85. See
CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT
PANEL,
111TH
CONG.,
FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 66 (Comm. Print
2009).

The [Homeowner Affordability and Stability] Plan does not deal
with mortgages that substantially exceed the value of the home. It
allows homeowners with [government guaranteed] mortgages . .. to
refinance .

.

. only if the value of the mortgage does not exceed 105

percent of the current appraisal value. . .[T]he homeowners most at
risk for foreclosure because of negative equity will be shut out of the
program.
Id.
86. These incentives include an up-front loan servicer participation
payment of $1,000, and $1,000 annual "pay for success fees" to be paid to
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not induce mortgage servicers to modify loans and make the
far larger reductions in principal balances of the likely
hundreds of billions of dollars in total needed to effectively
address the problem of underwater homeowners with
significant negative equity positions." HASP also does not
deal with the potential legal issues presented by the
modification of securitized mortgages," nor does it provide
sufficient financial incentives for holders of second mortgages
to assent to modification plans.
On March 26, 2010, the federal government announced a
new loan modification proposal under HASP that focused
more on the problems of underwater homeowners than had
In particular, it announced the
earlier efforts.o
commencement of a voluntary loan modification program for
underwater homeowners. If the investors were willing to
write the loan principal amount down to 97.75% of the
current appraised value of the property, the Federal Housing
Administration would then repay those loans, refinancing
them through new lending to the homeowners, and insuring
the new loans through the Federal Housing Administration.9 '
Importantly, the program does not require some level of
financial distress for underwater homeowner participation,9 2
although it is not open to those persons who currently have
Federal Housing Administration mortgages. In addition,
where the homeowners also had a second mortgage on the
property, as many underwater homeowners do, the loan could
be refinanced for as much as 115% of the current appraised
value. 93 The Federal Housing Administration was authorized
to spend up to $14 billion from the HASP funds to provide
incentives to investors and loan servicers, and to provide
servicers over the following three years if the modified loan payments continue
to be made. Incentives also include a $1,500 incentive payment for the
mortgage holder and $500 payment for the mortgage servicer if the loan is
modified while the loan payments are still current, as well as a $1,000 per year
reduction in the payments of borrowers if they remain current on their modified
loan payments, for up to five years. Id. at 64.
87. See supra note 75
88. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE
CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 67 (Comm. Print 2009).
89. Id. at 66-67.
90. David Streitfeld, A Salvage Operation,N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2010, at B1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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insurance on the refinanced loans, so as to encourage such
modifications. 94 No new funds were committed for this
initiative beyond the original HASP $75 billion authorization,
however,95 and while the new program will obviously be very
attractive to underwater homeowners, it appears unlikely
that it will provide sufficient incentive for lenders to
voluntarily agree to make very many substantial loan
principal reductions.96
In recent years Congress has repeatedly rejected
proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would
confer on judges the "cramdown" authority to discharge some
of the principal of residential first mortgage loans, and thus
give underwater homeowners more leverage with their loan
servicers to have their loans renegotiated to reduce or
eliminate their negative equity.97 HASP did include a very
narrow amendment to the bankruptcy laws that would grant
bankruptcy judges the authority to modify, to a limited
extent, recently-issued mortgages where the loan is within
certain size limits, and to then treat the homeowner's
negative equity as an unsecured debt.9 8 However, the Obama
Administration did not try to encourage another legislative
attempt to authorize broader judicial cramdown authority.
Why has the federal government not taken more
narrowly targeted and effective actions to encourage and
facilitate principal-reducing modifications of the mortgages of
Given the substantial
solvent underwater homeowners?
benefits to borrowers, lenders, and other parties negatively
impacted by foreclosures of modifications as an alternative to
foreclosures, one would expect more governmental action.
94. Id.
95. Id.

96. "Early reaction to the refinance program among lending groups was less
than enthusiastic. 'The magnitude of this program will likely be measured in
the tens of thousands rather than the hundreds of thousands of borrowers.'"
David Streitfeld, A Salvage Operation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2010, at B1.
(quoting Tom Deutsch, Executive Director of the American Securitization
Forum).
97. American Bankruptcy Institute, U.S. Senate Rejects Mortgage
Modification in Chapter 13 Cases: Sens. Durbin, Kyl Debate the Response to
America's Foreclosure Crisis, 28-5 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10 (2009) (referring
to the April 30, 2009 Senate rejection of S. 896, proposed by Senator Dick
Durbin, and to a prior 2007 rejection of a similar proposal by Senator Durbin).

98. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE
CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 64-65 (Comm. Print 2009).
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Additionally, the dangers involved in allowing the persistence
of such a huge and fragile overhang of potential strategic loan
defaults that could cascade at any time, with possibly
dramatic adverse macroeconomic consequences, create
further incentive for the government to act. There appear to
be several complementary reasons for this seemingly
irresponsible inaction.
Consider for a moment the possible option of a large-scale
bailout. The federal government could likely overcome all of
the obstacles to principal-reducing modifications that I have
discussed in Parts II and III above, and effectively facilitate
renegotiation of many, or even most, of the mortgage loans of
underwater homeowners to substantially reduce or even
eliminate their negative equity positions. This could be
accomplished if the government provided the powerful
incentive of a subsidy of a significant portion of the losses
that would have to be formally recognized by the affected
direct or indirect mortgage holders as a result of a substantial
number of such modifications. One rather obvious reason for
the government's reluctance to take this tact is that the
problem is truly massive in scope and would be hugely
expensive to address in such a bailout-type fashion. The
significant and widespread fall in housing prices over the last
few years has caused literally trillions of dollars of losses to
homeowners, financial institutions, and investors,99 a
substantial fraction of which are now embodied by the
underwater component of residential mortgages. While no
comprehensive and accurate statistics are available as to the
precise size of the residential negative equity problem, there
are credible estimates of there being at least 10.7 million and
perhaps over 15.2 million underwater homeowners,1 00 many
of whom are underwater by substantial amounts that are
sometimes as large as several hundred thousand dollars or
more.' 0 ' In light of these estimates, the aggregate amount of
homeowner negative equity has been conservatively
estimated as likely to be at least $800 billion, 102 and may even
be more than $1 trillion. 0
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 52.
See White, supra note 2, at 3 n.6.
Id. at 4.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6.
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Any attempt to provide a taxpayer subsidy on the order
of hundreds of billions of dollars to cover losses that are
widely perceived to often stem from irresponsible borrower or
lender behavior would almost certainly encounter
overwhelming-and probably fatal-political resistance in the
current highly partisan Washington climate of opinion,
particularly given the large and growing federal budget
deficits of recent years that are envisioned to persist and even
worsen indefinitely.
Professor Phillip Swagel, as the Treasury Department's
Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy from 2006 until 2009,
was a key player in many aspects of the various
governmental measures taken in response to the financial
crisis.104 He has made it abundantly clear that such an
expensive taxpayer bailout-type targeted approach to the
underwater homeowner problem never received serious
consideration by senior government policymakers during that
period. The Bush Administration's Hope Now Alliance
program of foreclosure prevention, launched in October
2007,10 focused upon encouraging modifications of the loans

of troubled borrowers with some equity in their homes who
were struggling to make their mortgage payments, and did
not provide incentives to encourage significant principalunderwater
solvent
for
modifications
reducing
Treasury Department officials well
homeowners. 106
understood that underwater homeowners "(rationally) did not
want to keep paying the monthly bill once the value of the
home had declined below their mortgage balance,"o0 but they
saw "little prospect of getting legislative approval for .

.

. a

08

Moreover, as noted
massive program to avoid foreclosure."
earlier, the general stance taken by Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson,'09 and reflected by other senior Treasury
104. See generally Swagel, supra note 51.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 10. "[It was quite rational for a person who got into a home with
little or no equity and then suffered a 40 or 50 percent price decline to walk
away." Id. at 19.
108. Id. at 4.
109. "And let me emphasize, any homeowner who can afford his mortgage
payment but chooses to walk away from an underwater property is simply a
speculator-and one who is not honoring his obligations." Henry M. Paulson,
Jr., U.S. Treasury Secretary, Remarks before the National Association of
Business Economists on the U.S. Housing and Mortgage Market (Mar. 3, 2008)
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Department officials, was one of scorn and hostility towards
underwater homeowners who were financially capable of
making their payments, but who nevertheless defaulted or
The Treasury Department
threatened to default.
consequently did not encourage nor did it pressure lenders to
modify such loans. 110
Swagel does note that in October, 2007, Treasury
Department economists were asked to formulate for further
discussion various plans to put public resources into
foreclosure prevention, and that one of these plans that was
prepared did focus primarily on underwater borrowers."'1
Under this plan, after a lender had agreed to a principalreducing modification, the federal government would
partially subsidize the cost of a guarantee of the modified
loan, with the borrower also obligated to pay part of the
annual premium for the guarantee.112 However, there was
strong resistance to this plan both within the Treasury
Department and among White House staff because such a
program "would inevitably involve a bailout of some
'irresponsible' homeowners."11 3 There was also the perception
that both Congress and the public would be intensely opposed
to such a bailout,114 so this plan was never pursued further.
In 2008, Congress did pass legislation sponsored by
Congressman Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd
(transcript available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp856.htm).
110. "The Treasury did not expect banks to modify loans when borrowers
could afford the payments but were balking at paying because they were
Secretary Paulson's view was that a
underwater-quite the opposite.
homeowner who could afford the mortgage but chose to walk away was a
speculator." Swagel, supra note 51, at 19.
111. Id. This plan was known internally at the Treasury as the "GHA." Id.
at 20.
112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. at 21.
114. Swagel summarizes the prevailing attitude of policymakers well:
[S]pending public money on foreclosure avoidance would be asking
responsible taxpayers to subsidize people living in McMansions they
could not afford, with flat-screen televisions paid for out of their home
equity line of credit. The policy rationale to spend public money is
clear in that there is a negative externality from foreclosures to home
inventories and thus prices. But the public opposition to such bailouts
appeared to be intense ....
Congress appeared to heed this opposition as well.

. .

. Until the

FDIC came out with a proposal late in 2008, there was no legislative
support to spend public money to actually prevent foreclosures ....
Id. at 15.
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that provided for Federal Housing Administrationguaranteed refinancing of mortgages for which lenders were
willing to write down the loan principal to 87% of the home's
current value."' This program was obviously very attractive
to underwater homeowners, and if it had been widely
embraced the negative equity problem would have been
largely resolved. However, such drastic modifications would
often involve a large loss for the lender, and no government
subsidy of those losses was provided beyond the guarantee of
the renegotiated loan, which after such a large reduction in
principal would likely present very little if any default risk
necessitating a guarantee.116 Accordingly, the program was
rather unattractive to lenders. While the Congressional
Budget Office originally optimistically estimated that 400,000
loan modifications would result, not surprisingly very few
loans were actually refinanced through this program." 7 The
same fate may well result for the very similar March, 2010
HASP initiative discussed above.118
The federal government has also not been very
supportive of other approaches to addressing the negative
equity problem that do not involve substantial government
expenditures or potentially expensive loan guarantees. For
example, the Treasury Department has opposed various
legislative proposals to amend the Bankruptcy Code to confer
upon bankruptcy courts the cramdown authority to
retroactively reduce the principal of mortgage loans. This
judicial authority would have given underwater homeowners
more negotiating leverage to obtain principal-reducing loan
However, opposition to this authority
modifications.
stemmed from concern that this "would have undesirable
consequences for the future availability of [mortgage
financing, particularly for] low-income borrowers.""' The
Treasury Department also considered a variety of external
policy proposals submitted by academics that generally
recommended that it promote shared-appreciation mortgages
in which homeowners would receive a loan modification in
115. Id. at 22; Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110289, 122 Stat. 2850 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
116. Swagel, supra note 51, at 22.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
119. Swagel, supra note 51, at 22.
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exchange for giving up part of the home's future price
appreciation to the lender.'2 0 But the Treasury Department
ultimately did not support such proposals because it
concluded that there was little demand for such sharedappreciation modification arrangements.1 21 It also chose not
to support a 2008 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
proposal for a loss-sharing insurance plan under which the
federal government would guarantee half of the loss suffered
by a lender upon a redefault of a suitably modified loan,
concluding that the proposal had both adverse selection and
moral hazard problems that made it more of a bailout for the
direct or indirect holders of mortgages than a benefit for

homeowners. 122
In summary, the federal government has essentially
placed its bets on the hope that its general economic stimulus
efforts-when coupled with modest homebuyer tax credits,
with herculean Federal Reserve System and governmentsponsored enterprise loan guarantees and asset purchase
efforts intended to keep mortgage financing available at
relatively low interest rates, and hopefully also accompanied
by a general worldwide economic recovery-will solve the
homeowner negative equity problem and will obviate the need
for more targeted but politically highly controversial
measures to avoid the possibility of a sudden and massive
wave of strategic defaults. There has apparently been wide
recognition among senior federal government policymakers,
from at least 2007 onwards, that there are millions of
underwater homeowners with significant negative equity
positions who, in the absence of substantial housing price
appreciation, might at some point eventually begin to
strategically default en masse, greatly exacerbating the
foreclosure crisis and leading to broader macroeconomic
120. Swagel does not specifically identify the particular shared appreciation
proposals that he was referring to here, but it is virtually certain that one of
those proposals was an earlier version of the proposal recently offered by Eric
Posner and Luigi Zingales. See generally Posner & Zingales, supra note 11.
121. Swagel, supra note 51, at 26. Swagel's brief comment that the Treasury
chose not to pursue this option because it concluded that there was "little
demand for it" did not clarify whether he was referring to a perception of limited
demand from underwater homeowners, or from mortgage servicers, or both. Id.
122. Id. at 27-28. "At the Treasury, we viewed the [FDIC's] loss-sharing
insurance proposal as a nontransparent way to funnel money to institutions
that had made bad lending decisions and to investors who had bought the
loans-a hidden bailout." Id. at 28.
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dislocations.
Further, it has been recognized that any
substantial home price appreciation in the near future is far
from assured and probably unlikely. However, there simply
has not been the political will to go beyond moral
exhortations aimed at discouraging strategic defaults and to
attempt to seriously address in some fashion the fundamental
negative equity problem. Attempts to initiate such efforts
have been badly undercut, as Professor White has extensively
discussed,1 23 and as Professor Swagel has confirmed, 124 by a
general unreflective attitude of moral condemnation of those
underwater homeowners who are financially capable of
continuing to make their mortgage payments but who choose
not to do so.
In addition, there is also, as Professor Swagel has
noted, 1 25 a widely-shared perception among policymakers that
any federal program authorizing the very large government
expenditures that would be necessary to successfully
encourage lenders to formally recognize hundreds of billions
of dollars of losses on their mortgage loans to underwater
homeowners would be widely regarded as a bailout of
irresponsible borrowers and lenders, and would arouse such
fierce public resistance that it would surely be "dead on
arrival" in Congress. Thus, under current policies, and in the
absence of substantial and sustained home price appreciation,
the negative equity problem will persist, and take a turn for
the worse if underwater homeowners ever soberly reassess
their circumstances en masse, causing strategic default rates
to sharply increase.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEM
A. General Featuresof the Proposal.
I have described above the various reasons why even
those underwater homeowners with significant negative
equity positions have been reluctant to threaten to default in
order to pressure their loan servicers to modify their loans by
outstanding
principal
reducing
their
substantially

123. White, supra note 2, at 23-35.
124. Swagel, supra note 51, at 19.
125. Id. at 21.
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balances.' 2 I have also described the numerous reasons why
loan servicers are reluctant to engage in those kinds of
principal-reducing loan modifications, 127 and why the federal
government has not taken effective measures to encourage
such modifications.12 8 As a result of these various factors,
there remain more than ten million solvent underwater
homeowners who continue to make their mortgage payments,
many of whom have large negative equity positions and
whose interests would be better served by defaulting rather
than by making those payments. This rather fragile and
unstable situation could at any time quickly turn into a
cascade of millions of new mortgage defaults and foreclosures,
with potentially severe macroeconomic consequences. Below,
I outline my thoughts about how this negative equity problem
could be effectively addressed through a program designed to
bring about large-scale loan modifications before the problem
leads to a new wave of foreclosures of crisis proportions.
My
I wish to offer politically realistic suggestions.
proposal will therefore be premised upon the realistic
assumption that there is no reasonable possibility that the
federal government will anytime in the foreseeable future
choose to provide large financial incentives to encourage
underwater homeowners and their loan servicers and
mortgage investors to engage in substantial principalreducing modifications. Even if new incentives are provided,
it is unlikely that they would be significantly more generous
than the modest $11,000 per modification total that is now
provided for the various participants in a qualifying loan
modification by the current HASP program.12 9 A large-scale
and well-financed taxpayer bailout program might actually be
the ideal way to quickly resolve the problem. However, any
multi-billion dollar program, designed to significantly
insulate solvent underwater homeowners and their direct and
indirect mortgage holders from bearing the losses associated
126. See supra Part II.
127. See supra Part III.
128. See supra Part IV.
129. The maximum combined amount of payments that could be made to the
homeowner, servicer, and investors involved in a particular loan modification
under HASP therefore appears to be calculated as: $1,000 + ($1000 x 3) +
$1,500 + $500 + ($1,000 x 5) = $11,000. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL,
111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 67 (Comm.
Print 2009).
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with the sharp fall in residential real estate prices that has
created these negative equity positions, would likely provoke
such vehement political resistance as to render any such
program infeasible.
In addition, I will also assume conservatively that there
is no reasonable possibility that Congress will reverse its
existing stance and confer upon bankruptcy judges the broad
cramdown authority to discharge the negative equity portion
of residential mortgage debts so as to dramatically increase
the leverage that underwater homeowners would have in any
loan renegotiations.
Given these two practical political constraints, what is
both necessary and sufficient to break the logjam now
impeding widespread principal-reducing modifications of the
loans of underwater homeowners would be if a large number
of them came forward en masse, stopped making their
mortgage payments, and credibly threatened to go through
foreclosure unless their obligations were renegotiated
downwards to substantially reduce or even eliminate their
negative equity positions, in which case they would cure their
deficiencies. If this broad and uncompromising demand for
loan modifications did arise, then the mortgage servicers
would no longer be concerned about the self-cure risks usually
associated with modifications.
These homeowners, by
defaulting and demanding substantial loan modifications as
the price of cure, would have now crossed the psychological
Rubicon of accepting the possibility of foreclosure, and would
be prepared to go through that process if those modifications
were not forthcoming. There would therefore be few if any
self-cures if the modifications were refused. Rather, there
would only be foreclosures, so that the possibility of foregoing
essentially costless self-cures by engaging in expensive loan
modifications would no longer be a risk for servicers to worry
about.
Under these circumstances of broad demand for
modifications, loan servicers would also no longer be
concerned about the possible contagion effects of modifying
loans. If virtually all of the solvent underwater homeowners
whom they feared might be inclined to threaten default, if
they learned that other borrowers were obtaining meaningful
loan modifications, have already come forward to demand
modifications, then the contagion would have already reached
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epidemic proportions and could get no worse. In addition, as
previously discussed, there will also be very little redefault
risk associated with such principal-reducing modifications
now that the homeowners with modified loans will have at
least a reasonable prospect of having some equity to protect.
Some of the other impediments that I have discussed that
arguably influence loan servicers to be reluctant to modify
loans would still exist, and the federal government could play
a very helpful role here in encouraging renegotiations without
having to commit itself to large expenditures. Federal
legislation could be adopted that would more clearly shelter
loan servicers from litigation that might be initiated by
disappointed direct mortgage lenders or indirect mortgagebacked security investors, or initiated by holders of second
mortgages on the subject properties, with regard to particular
loan modifications. This legislation should apply only to
those servicers that are able to show that those modifications
were done in a good faith attempt to maximize the aggregate
The government could also
return to investors. 130
aggressively investigate any instances of mortgage servicers
allegedly refusing to modify mortgage loans, despite this
generally being in their investors' ultimate interests as a
superior alternative to foreclosure, so as to maintain the
servicer's right to be paid the largest possible commissions
under their fixed-price contracts for loan servicing and
eventually also be paid large and effectively unreviewed
foreclosure-related fees. The government could then initiate
or support private parties in pressing breach of fiduciary duty
litigation where appropriate to discourage such action.
Unfortunately, there appears to be relatively little that
the federal government could do directly to soften the
130. In their article, Mayer, Morrison, and Piskorski discuss in some detail a
similarly-oriented "litigation safe harbor" that they propose could be federally
legislated to encourage loan modifications. Mayer, Morrison & Piskorski, supra
note 51, at 422-23. Their proposal would provide a temporary three-year
protection from litigation for loan servicers who modify loans or surrender
second liens in a good faith attempt to advance the interests of their investors
as a group. Their proposal would also abrogate certain provisions in the
securitization agreements that explicitly impeded such modifications, and
would require public disclosure of the details of any modifications. Id. at 423. A
comprehensive analysis of the appropriate standards for the conduct of
fiduciaries with conflicting obligations has been recently provided by Steven
Schwarez. See generally Steven L. Schwarez, Fiduciaries with Conflicting
Obligations,94 MINN. L. REV. 1867 (2010).
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unavoidable accounting consequences of the writing-off of
hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgage obligations of
underwater borrowers through these renegotiations. But
these homeowner and investor losses have already occurred
and are reflected in the heavily discounted prices offered in
the secondary markets for many mortgage-backed securities
and collateralized debt obligations.13 1
These loan
renegotiations would now force their formal recognition on
balance sheets. The formal recognition of these losses could
well threaten the regulatory capital adequacy, and even the
solvency, of some financial institutions and other entities that
have invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities. But
this large loss recognition appears to be an unavoidable
aspect of any fundamental resolution of the negative equity
problem. The federal government does, however, already
have in place various programs to provide financial support
for, or liquidate in orderly fashion, distressed financial
institutions, and to otherwise deal with these collateral
consequences of loss recognition.
Finally, with regard to servicer reluctance to engage in
substantial loan modifications stemming from the fear that
doing so will threaten their eligibility for a share of those
billions of dollars that they hope may be later made available
for a large-scale bailout of those persons suffering losses as a
result of real estate price declines, the government should try
to put those fears to rest by making it as clear as possible
that no such taxpayer-financed bailout is at all likely to be
forthcoming.
In brief summary, what I am suggesting here is a kind of
"carrot and stick" approach to forcing a loan modification
resolution of the homeowner negative equity problem. The
approach would focus on the incentive structure facing
mortgage loan servicers. The modest carrot that would be
held out to loan servicers would be federal legislation
eliminating the legal risks faced by those servicers who
negotiate substantial loan principal reductions in a good faith
attempt to maximize investor returns. The very large stick
that would be wielded would be demands from millions of
currently underwater homeowners for principal-reducing
131. "Prices of AAA mortgage backed securities oscillated around 35 cents on
the dollar in February 2009." Posner & Zingales, supra note 11, at 576.
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modifications, upon threat of default, accompanied by federal
investigations of and legal actions against any servicers who
improperly resisted those demands solely to maximize their
servicing and foreclosure fees. This approach would be
accompanied by a clear announcement that no bailout of
those persons suffering losses from real estate price declines
will be forthcoming.
So what form should these efforts to encourage broad
public demand for substantial loan modifications take? What
actions should be taken by the federal government and others
to help individual underwater borrowers with significant
negative equity positions better understand their current
situation? What steps can be taken to help homeowners
overcome their current unwillingness to threaten default, if
such a threat is necessary for them to be able to obtain
principal-reducing loan modifications from their reluctant
loan servicers? How can homeowners overcome the cognitive
and emotional factors-so well described by Professor
White-that now impede these persons from recognizing that
defaulting and going through a foreclosure process is often
their best course of action, should they be unable to obtain
major loan concessions, and that also impede them from
taking decisive action on the basis of this recognition?
From the point of view of those homeowners with
significant underwater positions, there fortunately would not
be posed a collective action problem. This is because each of
these individuals who would rationally strategically defaultwhile they, of course, would much prefer to obtain a loan
modification that would painlessly eliminate their negative
equity position rather than go through a foreclosure
proceeding-still have the incentive to go through foreclosure
if their servicer refuses to modify their loan regardless of
whether other borrowers are demanding or receiving
comparable concessions.
In designing a program, it should be kept in mind that
not only from the point of view of individual borrowers, but
also from the broader social point of view, it would be much
preferable for the loan servicers to significantly modify these
loans on a large scale rather than to impose these foreclosure
costs. For these modifications to occur, however, it will
probably require such a large proportion of the underwater
homeowners to come forward and strategically default that
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the servicers' fears that principal-reducing modifications will
then lead to a contagion effect of yet more demands for loan
modification are essentially rendered moot. This broad
servicer acquiescence to demands for modifications will
therefore be more likely to occur if the group of homeowners
that comes forward and demands significant loan
modifications is not only those homeowners that are
significantly underwater, but also includes other not-quite-sofar-underwater homeowners for whom foreclosure is perhaps
only marginally, if at all, better than their continuing to
make payments. Since the goal of the overall program would
be widespread loan modifications rather than foreclosures, it
should not only provide public education and assistance
resources that will help significantly underwater homeowners
better understand the financial advantages of default, and
then act accordingly, but it should also include efforts to help
other, not-quite-so-far-underwater homeowners to collectively
overcome their reluctance to risk foreclosure and also come
forward with demands for modifications.
One realistic and relatively inexpensive step would be to
begin a large-scale public education and assistance campaign
designed to provide underwater homeowners with the
information and professional assistance necessary for them to
accurately calculate and understand where their true
interests lie. The campaign should also be designed to
encourage them to default if this is their optimal course of
action and if their loan servicer is unwilling to otherwise
negotiate substantial principal reductions.
These
homeowners could be given assistance in carrying out the
relatively complex financial calculations regarding the tradeoffs they would face if they defaulted on their loans, and could
also be advised as to the limited range of circumstances under
which they may have any federal tax liability for discharged
Homeowners could also be advised as to the
debt. 132
applicable state anti-deficiency laws that would protect many
of them altogether from deficiency judgment liability, and as
to the actually quite limited risk of deficiency judgment
liability they would face in those states that do not have such
132. See supra note 30 (referring to the potential tax liability for homeowners
after foreclosure if they have engaged in cash-out refinancings or have taken
out home equity loans, and then used the loan proceeds for purposes other than
improving the property).
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anti-deficiency laws. Finally, homeowners could be advised
as to the actual length and modest severity of the
consequences of default for one's credit rating.
Professor White has described such a public education
approach as a "solution that naturally follows" from the
"norm asymmetry" between mortgage borrowers and
lenders,' 3 but he then somewhat surprisingly backed away
from endorsing this approach. He described it as being
"distasteful to most policy makers,"'"' and chose not to pursue
it further. I respectfully disagree with his reluctance to
advocate such public education and assistance efforts. Loan
servicers and mortgage investors certainly calculate in a
clear-eyed fashion where their financial interests lie and then
act on those calculations, as White makes abundantly
clear.135 In fairness, underwater homeowners should be
encouraged and assisted to do the same. The message that
should henceforth be sent to these homeowners by
professional counselors and others concerned with their best
interests is that there is nothing shameful or immoral about
going through foreclosure as a matter of choice, rather than of
necessity. Furthermore, homeowners should be advised as to
the low (often zero) probability of their being held responsible
for a deficiency judgment after foreclosure, their exemption
from tax liability for most discharged mortgage debt, and the
relatively minor and fairly short-term impact of the adverse
credit rating consequences of foreclosure, as compared to its
benefits. The rational move for an underwater homeowner
may well be to default and threaten to go through foreclosure
if his loan servicer refuses to substantially reduce his loan
principal balance. Underwater homeowners need help to
realize that this course of action should be thought of as
simply the exercise of an in-the-money put option right, and
that the decision should be evaluated in those dispassionate
terms.
At relatively little cost, the federal government could
provide some valuable support guidance for this public
133. White, supra note 2, at 44.
134. "Whether or not such [a public education campaign to encourage
defaults] would be effective, it would likely be so distasteful to most policy
makers, and many readers of this article, that this idea will not be pursued
further here." Id.
135. Id. at 38, 52.
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education and assistance effort by requiring all federally
approved and supported housing and credit counseling
agencies to make significant efforts to send such a message.
State governments could also do the same within their scope
of operations. Non-governmental, public interest-oriented
actors that are now involved in some way with the problems
facing underwater homeowners-such as churches and other
local community organizations, legal defense organizations,
and academics generally-could also help contribute to
changing the climate of opinion regarding foreclosure.
Specifically, they could help ensure that it is no longer
thought of as a shameful and dangerous prospect, or as a
form of financial suicide to be avoided at almost all costs, but
simply as just another financial decision of no particular
moral import. Private attorneys might also come to see the
need for informed counsel for underwater homeowners as
offering an opportunity for them to provide these services for
modest compensation.13 6 This effort would also help motivate
those not-quite-so-far-underwater homeowners, who in some
instances would probably be better served by continuing to
make their payments rather than by defaulting and going
through foreclosure, to also make demands for modifications
in the hope that these demands would be granted without
Such additional demands for
undue resistance.
modifications, even if the homeowners involved were not in
all instances prepared to actually follow up with their
threatened defaults, would further increase the likelihood
that what would result from all of these borrower demands
would be significant loan modifications done on a very large
scale, rather than a new wave of additional foreclosures.
Another measure that would encourage some additional
underwater homeowners to demand loan modifications would
be to amend the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Act of 2007 to
136. As an example of how private attorneys might seek to benefit from the
need for informed counsel for underwater homeowners, and in so doing provide
a useful service, there is currently a San Diego-based firm named You Walk
Away, LLC, which for $995, will provide underwater homeowners considering
defaulting on their mortgages with legal information and other services. See
Kelly Bennet, Is ForeclosureRight for You?, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO, Feb. 6, 2008,
http://youwalkaway.com/press/voiceofsandiego.org-%20Housing...%20%27Is%20
If the overall climate of opinion
Foreclosure%20Right%20for%2OYou.pdf.
became more supportive of strategic defaults, doubtless more attorneys would
seek to provide the needed legal counsel and assistance for homeowners.
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broaden the federal tax liability exemption given to
discharged mortgage debt to now also include the debt
incurred through a cash-out refinancing or through a home
equity loan when those loan proceeds were spent for purposes
other than improvement of the property. 13 7 In addition,
federal legislation amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act
could be adopted along the lines recommended by Professor
White, so as to prevent lenders from reporting mortgage
defaults and foreclosures to credit rating agencies.138 This
amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act would reduce
the fear factor associated with the contemplation of
foreclosure, as well as reduce foreclosure's adverse
consequences for borrowers. On the other hand, such a
measure could perhaps be legitimately criticized as
inefficiently distorting the information available for
subsequent lenders to use in making their judgments as to
borrower creditworthiness.
Another measure that might also be very helpful in
encouraging underwater homeowners to demand substantial
modifications would be the adoption of a "national antideficiency law," covering both senior and junior residential
real estate mortgage obligations, as is recommended briefly in
passing by White.1 39 Such a statute would provide some
assurance to underwater homeowners that they would not be
held liable for potentially large deficiency judgments after
foreclosure proceedings, and if well-publicized the statute
would help to overcome homeowner reluctance to threaten
mortgage servicers with default. However, for such a statute
to provide effective legal protection for currently underwater
homeowners considering default, it would have to apply
retroactively to the mortgage loans that had been entered
into before the statute was adopted, rather than apply only
prospectively to future obligations as does most legislation.
While such retroactive abrogation of pre-existing lender
rights to seek deficiency judgments (which exist in some but
not all states) might at first glance appear to be
impermissible for a state government to carry out under the
137. See generally Les Christie, Foreclosed? Here Comes the Tax Man,
CNNMONEY,
Apr.
14,
2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/0408/pf/taxes mortgagedebtlindex.htm.
138. White, supra note 2, at 45-52.
139. Id. at 46 n.212, 53 n.232.
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literal text of the "Contracts Clause"-Article I, Section 10 of
the U.S. Constitutionl 4 0-it has been convincingly argued
that since the 1934 Supreme Court case of Home Building &
4
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,1
' this formerly significant
constitutional provision is no longer regarded as providing a
meaningful restraint on state action.14 2 Therefore, such
protection from deficiency judgments could be constitutionally
provided by state law revisions with retroactive effect.14 3
Further, it is even less likely that a federal anti-deficiency
statute with retroactive effect, but not expressly subject to
that same constitutional restriction, would be found to have
any constitutional defects. 1 "
B. Loan ModificationNegotiations under the Proposal.
Assume for the sake of argument that my proposal was
implemented, and that it proved to be sufficient to result in a
large number of underwater homeowners with significant
negative equity positions strategically defaulting and
demanding loan modifications with substantial principal
reductions as the price of cure. What kind of modified loan
terms would likely result from such negotiations? Below, I
will present a general analysis of the various constraints
imposed on such negotiations, and of the nature of the
resulting outcomes.
Each of the many individual negotiations between
underwater homeowners and their loan servicers can be
140. "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of

Contracts . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
141. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
142. James W. Ely, Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause? 13-15
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law School, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No.
09-21, 2009).
143. The various states could, for example, adopt either variations of section
511(b) of the Uniform Land Security Interest Act, or variations of the relevant
provisions of the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, so as to provide
defaulting homeowners with such protection against deficiency judgment
liability. John Mixon, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Documents
Interpreted as NonrecourseDebt, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 35, 82 (2008).
144. Such a federal anti-deficiency statute with retroactive effects could
conceivably be challenged as a regulatory "taking" of some of the wealth of
mortgage creditors to such a degree as to violate the Takings Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, or as to constitute a violation of the Due Process rights of
mortgage creditors. These challenges appear to be unlikely to succeed, but a
comprehensive analysis of the constitutionality of such a federal statute is a
question that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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modeled as a bilateral monopoly situation in which each
party has only the two options of either dealing with the other
party on terms acceptable to that other party, or breaking off
negotiations and going through the foreclosure process. First,
I will discuss in general terms the position of each of these
two parties in such negotiations, and then I will present an
illustrative numerical example of the range of possible
mutually-advantageous outcomes for a typical such
negotiation.
From the point of view of the lender, its default option is
to put the property through foreclosure, receiving the
property's market value minus the lender's foreclosurerelated costs. 145 Consequently, if a lender can convince the
homeowner to accept a modified loan principal balance at the
market interest rate that exceeds that lower bound by enough
to cover all of the additional lender costs associated with
modifying a loan,146 it would be better off making that loan
modification rather than pursuing a foreclosure. From the
point of view of the underwater homeowner, his default
option is also to go through foreclosure, eliminating his
negative equity position but bearing all of his foreclosurerelated costs. These costs would include the cost of any risk
he bears of being found liable for a deficiency judgment or for
tax obligations, the cost of any adverse impacts upon his
credit rating, and any other personal costs associated with
going through foreclosure and moving to a different residence.
If a homeowner can convince the lender to accept a modified
loan principal balance at the market interest rate that
exceeds the market value of the property by no more than
these foreclosure-related costs, he would be better off
accepting that modification than going through foreclosure
and bearing those foreclosure-related costs.
There is therefore, in most instances, a range of possible
loan modifications with a new loan principal balance in the
general vicinity of the property's current market value that
are mutually advantageous to both the lender and the
145. These foreclosure-related costs have been estimated to average as much
as $60,000 per foreclosure. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG.,
FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION 1, 9 (Comm. Print 2009).

146. These costs would include the costs of negotiating a modification, as well
as any costs associated with any legal risks or regulatory difficulties that might
be associated with modifying a loan to reduce its outstanding principal balance.
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underwater homeowner relative to how they each would fare
in a foreclosure proceeding. Rational parties should agree to
a modified loan principal, at the market interest rate, that is
set in amount somewhere between the lender's lower bound of
the market value of the home minus the lender's foreclosurerelated costs plus the lender's loan modification-related costs,
and the borrower's upper bound of the market value of the
home plus his foreclosure-related costs. There is probably
considerable room here for a deal in most cases, and exactly
where within that range of mutually advantageous outcomes
the parties will agree depends generally upon their relative
bargaining power and abilities.
Let me illustrate the above reasoning with a simple and
typical numerical example. Assume that a homeowner, who
had the funds for a $30,000 down payment, borrowed an
additional $570,000 from a lender in 2006 on interest-only
initial mortgage payment terms to buy a $600,000 California
house with a 5% down payment. Also assume (quite
realistically) that the market value of that house has now
declined by 50% to $300,000. The homeowner now has an
approximately $270,000 negative equity position on the
house. If the homeowner defaults and the house goes through
foreclosure, and if we assume for this example that the
lender's foreclosure-related costs would total $60,000,147 then
the lender will only realize $240,000 from the foreclosure.
The lender will therefore be in a better position if he is able to
convince the homeowner to accept a modified loan balance, at
the market interest rate, totaling enough more than $240,000
so as to cover its additional costs of modifying the loan. Also
assume for this example that those loan modification costs
would total $10,000. The lender should thus agree to modify
the loan if he can get the borrower to accept at least a
$250,000 modified principal balance at the market interest
rate.
From the borrower's perspective, as a result of a
foreclosure he would then have a zero negative equity
position, plus he would need to bear his foreclosure-related
costs. Assume for this example that those foreclosure-related
costs would total $25,000. The borrower will therefore agree
to modify the loan if he can convince the lender to reduce the
147. See supra note 59.
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outstanding principal balance to no more than the $300,000
market value of the house, plus his $25,000 foreclosurerelated costs, or a total of $325,000, loaned at the market rate
of interest. Therefore, based on these numerical upper and
lower bounds, a modified loan at the market interest rate
with a principal balance somewhere between $250,000 and
$325,000 will be preferable to both parties over a foreclosure
proceeding. Where exactly within this broad range any two
given rational parties will reach agreement depends on their
relative bargaining power and abilities.
To the extent that either a lender's foreclosure-related
costs are lower or its loan modification-related costs are
higher than are assumed in the example above, or to the
extent that a borrower's foreclosure-related costs are lower
than assumed in the example above, this would shrink the
range of mutually advantageous outcomes, i.e., reduce the
room for a deal. If the cost factors change in this way, and
this range is sufficiently compressed, then unfortunately no
deal could be reached and a foreclosure would result. But to
the extent that a lender's foreclosure-related costs are higher,
or its loan modification-related costs are lower, or the
borrower's foreclosure-related costs are higher than assumed
in the example above, this will increase the range of mutually
advantageous outcomes, making it presumably even easier
for the parties to reach agreement than in the example
presented. 148
C. Advantages of the Proposal.
My proposal has a number of obvious advantages over
the current status quo. First of all, it appears to have some
promise for encouraging and facilitating the widespread
modification of the mortgage debt of underwater borrowers so
as to sharply reduce or eliminate the negative equity
overhang and the associated risk of a sudden future cascade
148. The current situation, in which many underwater homeowners are
unwilling to utilize the threat of default to induce their loan servicers to modify
their loans, could be similarly conceptualized as a bilateral monopoly
bargaining situation. Under this situation, the "borrower's foreclosure-related
costs" are so high due to borrower fear of the consequences of foreclosure that
the upper end of the range of mutually acceptable modifications includes the
current outstanding loan balance, and the "loan modification" consequently
generally agreed to is for the borrower to simply keep making his payments on
his existing loan.
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of strategic defaults and foreclosures, although it is possible
that either homeowner or loan servicer attitudes would prove
to be more resistant than hoped for to the suggested
measures, and any mutually acceptable modifications would
be more difficult to reach. Moreover, my proposal would
accomplish this end without requiring a large-scale
commitment of government funds, as a bailout-type approach
would necessitate, and it would not pressure loan servicers
into making loan modifications in the shadow of the threat of
coerced principal reductions made possible by changes in the
cramdown provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.' 49 The rather
modest and relatively inexpensive combination of expanded
public information and assistance for underwater
homeowners, statutory protections for loan servicers entering
into good faith modifications, greater scrutiny of servicer
compliance with their fiduciary duty obligations to their
investors, and a few statutory limitations imposed upon
mortgage creditor remedies and borrower tax liability may be
all that is needed to begin the orderly unwinding of the large
and dangerous negative equity overhang through loan
modifications. These changes would render unnecessary any
highly disruptive and inefficient foreclosures.
While an approach along the lines of my proposal would
avoid the major controversies that would accompany a large
taxpayer bailout or major changes in the Bankruptcy Code, it
would still almost certainly encounter substantial opposition.
Such public education and assistance efforts, and mortgage
debtor-protective statutes that would together serve to
encourage mortgage defaults by solvent underwater
homeowners, would likely be resisted quite strenuously by
financial creditors and their associated trade associations and
political allies. Those critics would doubtless choose to
emphasize the moral condemnation of encouraging persons
who are capable of paying their debts to not do so, rather
149. 1 must concede, however, that there is an element of implicit coercion in
my proposal. If loan servicers are faced with determined demands by borrowers
for principal-reducing modifications, upon pain of default if their demands are
denied, and if loan servicers conduct, as to whether their decisions to agree to
such modifications or to instead pursue foreclosures were consistent with their
fiduciary duty obligations to their investors, was subject to review, they may
well feel effectively coerced, as a practical if not a legal matter, to enter into
such modifications. In some sense, that feeling of coercion imposed on loan
servicers may be viewed as one hope of my proposal.
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than the threat to creditor economic interests of such conduct.
However, apart from the obvious rejoinder that can be made
to this rather dubious moral critique,'6 o a powerful counterargument can also be made that the social and economic
benefits of winding down the negative equity problem would
redound, not only to the benefit of those borrowers, but would
also benefit creditors of all kinds to a very major extent. This
is because a resolution to the negative equity problem would
significantly lower the risk of the eruption sometime in the
near future of a sudden wave of strategic defaults by
underwater homeowners and subsequent foreclosures that
could trigger another downward economic spiral that would
be hurtful to all, debtors and creditors alike.
Internal discussions of approaches to the negative equity
problem following the same general lines as my proposal have
doubtless taken place within the White House, within many
governmental agencies, and among members of Congress in
recent years, even though those internal discussions
apparently did not reach the stage where they were
externally vetted. One reason for this may have been that
strong creditor resistance to such proposals for strengthening
mortgage debtor resolve to seek modifications and for
weakening mortgage creditor rights was exercised covertly
behind closed doors. If so, this would not be at all surprising.
Mortgage creditors of course benefit from having the legal
right in some states to pursue mortgage debtors for deficiency
judgments, even if that right is primarily only useful as an in
terrorum deterrent and is generally not practical to
exercise. 15 Creditors further benefit from having the right to
150. White, supra note 2, at 53.
[I]t is time to put to rest the assumption that a borrower who exercises
the option to default is somehow immoral or irresponsible. To the
contrary, walking away may be the most financially responsible choice
if it allows one to meet one's unsecured credit obligations or provide for
the future economic stability of one's family. Individuals should not be
artificially discouraged on the basis of "morality" from making
financially prudent decisions, particularly when the party on the other
side is amorally operating according to market norms and could have
acted to protect itself by following prudent underwriting practices.
Id.
151. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of
Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073 (2009) (finding that
even in recourse states, deficiency judgment actions are often not cost-effective
for the lender, thus turning recourse loans into de facto non-recourse loans).
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publicly disseminate foreclosure information that will damage
the credit ratings of defaulting borrowers. Creditors of all
types, mortgage and otherwise, also obviously benefit from
the reinforcement of the widespread, if somewhat
problematic,' 52 social attitude that the non-payment of one's
debts by one who can afford to do so is morally blameworthy,
even if one can legally avoid those obligations, and even if as
a practical matter the commonly feared potential
consequences of default are often actually rather remote
possibilities or not really that severe in nature.
Representatives of debtors and creditors will doubtless
tend to align on different sides of these issues of whether and
how to encourage underwater homeowners to default on their
mortgages so as to motivate loan servicers to significantly
modify their loans to reduce or even eliminate their negative
This trend has often been the case
equity positions.
throughout history when policy questions have involved the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relationships in some
fundamental fashion. The creditor lobbying pressure to block
such a program would no doubt be fierce indeed, but in my
opinion it would not necessarily prevail. It remains to be seen
whether these creditor interests would be powerful enough to
prevent the adoption of a plan for resolving the underwater
homeowner problem along the lines of my proposal, were such
a plan to be seriously debated in policy-making circles and its
overall macroeconomic advantages consequently better
appreciated. 15
V. THE MERITS OF THE POSNER AND ZINGALES
PROPOSAL
Professors Posner and Zingales, in their recent and
interesting paper, agree with my view that what is most
needed to fundamentally resolve the homeowner negative
equity problem is for a large proportion of these underwater
152. See White, supra note 2.
153. Not only would the widespread modification of the mortgages of
underwater homeowners greatly reduce the chance of a sudden surge in
strategic defaults, with likely severe and adverse macroeconomic consequences,
but it would also reduce the other economic costs of millions of homeowners
being burdened with negative equity. These other costs include both depressed
consumer spending and drastically reduced household mobility, which in turn
contributes to increased structural unemployment, and reduced labor
productivity. White, supra note 2, at 50-52.
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homeowners to have their mortgages modified so that the
outstanding mortgage balance would be much closer to the
house's current value.' 5 4 However, they set forth a very
different framework than my proposal for overcoming the
obstacles that are now impeding such modifications.
A brief summary of the main lines of their proposal
reveals that it is mathematically somewhat complex, but
conceptually relatively straightforward. Under the Posner
and Zingales proposal, every underwater homeowner who
lives in a postal ZIP code area where the median house price
has dropped 20% or more from its recent peak would have a
new "current value" calculated for their house by applying
their ZIP code area median price decline percentage to the
initial purchase price of their house.15 5 These homeowners
would then be eligible to have their outstanding mortgage
balance reduced to that so calculated "current value,"
regardless of how much (if any) their particular house has
actually declined in value.'"' Underwater homeowners who
live in ZIP code areas that have not suffered at least a 20%
median price decline from their peak prices would be
ineligible for this program, no matter how much their
particular houses may have declined in value. In exchange
for having the principal of the loan so reduced, a qualifying
homeowner would have to agree to pay over to his mortgage
lender, upon the subsequent sale of his house, 50% of any
price appreciation that has taken place since the loan
modification. That price appreciation would be similarly
calculated by multiplying the percentage appreciation in the
value of the median house in that ZIP code area since the
date that the loan modification took place by the "current
value" of the house at the time of the modification.'
154. "The goal is to force a renegotiation between the homeowner with
negative equity and the owner or owners of the mortgage." Posner & Zingales,
supra note 11, at 578.
155. "People with positive equity do not qualify [for the Posner and Zingales
plan.]" Id. at 593.
156. Id. at 589.
157. Id. at 589-90. The use of changes in the median home price for a ZIP
code area, rather than the use of the subject house's actual price appreciation, is
intended to counter the "moral hazards" that would be created by using the
actual sale price data. These hazards include the possibility of homeowners
falsely documenting the sales taking place as doing so at low prices, while they
also obtain unrecorded side payments, and also undercutting homeowners'
incentives to maintain the house in good condition since they would then have
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For example, if an underwater homeowner had initially
purchased a house for $600,000, and currently has a $550,000
outstanding mortgage balance on the house, and the
percentage decline in the median house price in his ZIP code
area since its recent peak price was 24%, then he would now
have a "current value" calculated for his house of $600,000 (0.24 x $600,000) = $456,000, and he would be eligible to have
his loan balance reduced to that same $456,000 "current
value." If he then sold his house five years later, and if the
median home price in his ZIP code area had increased over
that time period by 20% from the level it was at when his
loan was modified, he would then be credited with price
appreciation, measured in this particular way, of $456,000 x
.20 = $91,200. He would then be obligated to pay 50% of this
appreciation-$45,600-to his mortgage lender. 58 The lender
would therefore, upon the later sale of the property, recover
some portion of the loan principal reduction and thus reduce
(and perhaps even eliminate) its overall losses on the loan
modification."
This shared appreciation loan modification
procedure would be enabled by amending Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code to allow for the homeowner to initiate a
to share those gains with their lenders. Id. at 596.
158. Neither the market value of the house at the time of the loan
modification, nor its actual sale price at the later time of sale would be relevant
for determining the amount of house price appreciation to be divided upon a
sale. The relevant prices here would be based on ZIP code area median
numbers. The actual price appreciation that took place for a property thus
might not be divided on a 50-50 basis between the homeowner and the lender.
If the particular house sold had appreciated more in percentage terms than did
the median house in that ZIP code area, then the homeowner would be able to
retain more than 50% of this actual appreciation. Id. at 590. On the other
hand, if the house appreciated less than the median house for that ZIP code
area then the lender would receive obtain more than 50% of this actual
appreciation. Id. This approach of applying a standard formula to public
information would reduce the opportunities for persons to manipulate the
process with phony appraisals or sale price information. Id. at 590-91.
159. This procedure would appear to allow the homeowner to avoid having to
share the future appreciation of the property with the lender by the ploy of
immediately selling the property, paying off the modified mortgage without
having to share any appreciation, since none has yet occurred, and then buying
an identical property with similar mortgage financing and no shared
appreciation obligations. Posner and Zingales recognize this possibility, but
argue that because of the transaction costs involved in selling a property and
buying another, relatively few recipients of modified mortgages would be
inclined to pursue this option. If such behavior did prove to be a problem, the
plan could be modified to allow the lender to reassert their claim to the stripped
down portion of the prior mortgage. Id. at 599-600.
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streamlined "prepackaged bankruptcy" proceeding that would
have these effects.16 0 Once this amendment was adopted,
however, probably many, if not most, such modifications
would be negotiated outside of bankruptcy. The availability
of this option would provide homeowners who were willing to
sacrifice half of their price appreciation potential in order to
eliminate their negative equity position with the needed
leverage to get their loan servicers to agree to such terms
without their having to file for bankruptcy.
The advantages of the Posner and Zingales approach as
compared to the current status quo, or as compared to a
taxpayer-financed bailout-type approach, are obvious and
substantial. First, this plan does not require significant
taxpayer funding since there is no bailout of the homeowner
or mortgage investor losses that have occurred due to price
Second, the Bankruptcy Code amendments
declines.
advocated by Posner and Zingales would empower
underwater borrowers to unilaterally commence (or threaten
to commence) the loan modification process, thus addressing
to some extent the critical problem I have discussed earlier of
loan servicer reluctance to engage in principal-reducing
modifications. In addition, their use of median price changes
to determine for which ZIP code areas homeowners would
qualify for such modifications, and to determine the amount
of the specific principal reductions to be allowed and the
amount of price appreciation that will later be divided
between borrowers and lenders upon the eventual sale of the
house, makes the plan much easier to apply administratively
than if house-specific price data had to be used in each
instance and verified for its accuracy to prevent abuses.
The Posner and Zingales proposal does, however, have
some significant drawbacks as compared to my proposal.
Their proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code would
make mortgage servicer participation in such principalreducing loan modifications legally compulsory at the option
of the homeowner, rather than being wholly consensual as it
is under my approach. 61 Therefore, their approach would
160. Posner & Zingales, supra note 11, at 579.
161. I concede that the combination of broad and insistent demands for loan
modifications by underwater homeowners, upon pain of default, (hopefully)
generated by my proposal, accompanied by close regulatory scrutiny as to
whether loan servicers were making decisions that realized the maximum
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likely trigger the same strong political resistance as other
attempts to expand in various ways the cramdown authority
of bankruptcy judges in the residential mortgage area. My
proposal avoids the need for any such controversial changes
in bankruptcy law. In addition, with regard to accurately
targeting underwater homeowners, the Posner and Zingales
proposal with its ZIP code area-based eligibility threshold is
underinclusive, perhaps significantly so.162
It denies
eligibility to all underwater homeowners who happen to live
in ZIP code areas that have had less than a 20% decline in
median home prices.16 3 A ZIP code area with an 18% decline
in the median home price in recent years, for example, likely
has a large number of underwater homeowners who initially
purchased their homes during the last few years with small
or even zero down payments, but would not be allowed to
participate in this plan. My proposal, in contrast, allows
every underwater homeowner to demand a loan modification,
although it does not arm them with the threat of coercively
obtaining principal reductions, subject to shared appreciation
obligations, through a streamlined mandatory Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceeding as does the Posner and Zingales
proposal.
Another drawback of the Posner and Zingales proposal is
possible value for their investors, would make such loan modifications virtually
compulsory as a practical matter. However, the fact remains that under my
proposal, loan servicers would retain the legal right to refuse to engage in any
particular principal-reducing loan modification, while under the Posner and
Zingales approach, they could be compelled to do so through the Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceeding.
162. I am not aware of any statistics regarding the proportion of underwater
borrowers who live in those ZIP code areas that have had less than 20% median
home price declines in recent years, nor any statistics regarding the average
and aggregate negative equity of those borrowers.
But these borrowers
obviously could comprise a significant proportion of all underwater borrowers,
and of all negative equity.
Posner and Zingales recognize this
underinclusiveness, describing it as a "Type I error" of their proposal, although
they do not attempt to quantify its magnitude, and they defend it as the
inevitable effect of having a "bright-line rule for administrative convenience"
that is "justified" because of "the vast cost of administering millions of mortgage
write-downs." They apparently believe that this cost would be unacceptably
increased were their proposal to be made more complex and discerning so as to
eliminate this underinclusiveness. Posner & Zingales, supra note 11, at 594.
163. If an underwater homeowner was located in a ZIP code area where
median house prices have not fallen the requisite 20%, he would not be eligible
to participate under the Posner and Zingales proposal, regardless of how large
his individual underwater position happened to be.
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that the use of the median price decline in a particular
qualifying ZIP code area to determine the percentage
reduction in the loan principal for a given homeowner, rather
than the actual price decline for that property, is a rather
crude and approximate measure that may easily reduce that
homeowner's mortgage balance either not enough or more
than necessary to eliminate his negative equity position. In
contrast, under my proposal, the amount of principal
reduction in a particular loan modification would be
individually negotiated, with borrowers being unlikely to
settle for much less than total elimination of their negative
equity, 1 64 and lenders unlikely to make much greater
concessions than this, 6 1 likely leading to modified mortgages
roughly equal in size to the current value of the house,
obviously a socially desirable result.
Similarly, the ZIP code area median measure of the
percentage amount of price appreciation that would be
divided equally between the borrower and the lender upon
sale is another crude measure that may not accurately reflect
the true appreciation for a particular house. This could lead
to windfalls by one party at the expense of the other in terms
of sharing the actual property's appreciation on a rather
random, haphazard basis in those qualifying ZIP code areas
that proved to be heterogeneous with regard to the rates of
price appreciation of particular houses.16 6 In particular, a
homeowner, whose property experienced only a relatively
164. A rational borrower would not accept a loan modification that left him
with negative equity greater than his expected foreclosure costs. See supra note
132 and accompanying text.
165. A rational lender would not accept a loan modification that specified a
loan principal balance less than what the lender could recover in a foreclosure
proceeding, plus the lender's loan modification costs. See supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
166. If, for example, a house had appreciated 100% from $200,000 up to
$400,000 after a loan modification down to a $200,000 mortgage balance had
taken place, but the median rate of price appreciation for that district was only
20%, then only $240,000 - $200,000 = $40,000 of that appreciation would be
split evenly between the borrower and the lender. This would give the borrower
90% of the actual $200,000 price appreciation, and the lender only 10%. But if
that same house had only appreciated by only 5% from $200,000 to $210,000
over that time period, again $240,000 - $200,000 = $40,000 would be split evenly
between the borrower and the lender. This would give the lender $20,000, a full
200% of the actual price appreciation, and leaving the borrower with only
$190,000 after the sale, not even enough to pay off his $200,000 mortgage
obligation.
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small appreciation in value of less than 50% of that
appreciation experienced by the median house in that ZIP
code area, would actually owe to the lender-upon the sale of
the property and under the shared appreciation featuremore than 100% of that appreciation, and would thus be
exposed in some instances to potential liability for the unpaid
balance."I This unfortunate situation could arise for a
significant number of homeowners in a qualifying ZIP code
area that had substantial heterogeneity of price appreciation.
One important aspect of the Posner and Zingales plan is
that the loan modifications that it would induce would be
substantially more generous to mortgage investors and less
generous to homeowners than those modifications that would
likely take place under my proposal. Under their plan, the
mortgage investors who have written off the negative
homeowner equity portions of the mortgage loans through
these loan modifications would eventually recapture a
perhaps quite substantial portion of those losses through
their rights to receive, upon sale, 50% of the (median for the
ZIP code area) property appreciation since the modification.
Under my proposal, in contrast, there would be no such
shared appreciation feature for the modified loans unless the
borrowers and lenders had agreed to such an arrangement,
and there is no incentive created under my proposal for
borrowers to offer such a concession. Nor would such a
concession be necessary to induce servicers to engage in such
modifications under the very limited "modify the loan
substantially or you will have to foreclose" choice that they
would be presented with by many of their underwater
homeowner borrowers, if my approach were to prove
successful in helping those borrowers understand where their
best interests lie, and acting accordingly.
The difference between the Posner and Zingales approach
and my proposal, with regard to the relative distribution of
the burdens of principal-reducing loan modifications that we
each seek to encourage, goes to the heart of the fundamental
difference in our approaches as to how to address the core
problem of loan servicer reluctance to agree to such
167. Posner and Zingales recognize this possibility, but "expect that the risk
of such an outcome is relatively low," and that if this problem turned out to be
significant, then their suggested 50-50 allocation of price appreciation could be
adjusted. Posner & Zingales, supra note 11, at 597.
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modifications. Their plan attempts primarily to make these
modifications somewhat more attractive to loan servicers by
incorporating a shared appreciation feature, and then to
encourage those modifications to actually take place by also
giving underwater homeowners the leverage through
bankruptcy law to force loan servicers to enter into them.
But their plan still does not make these shared appreciation
modifications as attractive to loan servicers as simply having
the underwater borrowers continue to make their payments
on their existing mortgages, if this option is possible.
Moreover, the shared appreciation feature has the counterproductive effect of making such modifications far less
attractive for underwater homeowners to pursue. As a result,
probably very few of those underwater borrowers would
invoke or threaten to invoke the newly-available bankruptcy
procedure to force their loan servicers to enter into those
shared appreciation modifications, ** and the loan servicers
have no economic reason to do so without such pressure.
Under my proposal, in contrast, there is no attempt to try
to make the desired principal-reducing modifications more
attractive to loan servicers than their continuing to receive
payments under existing mortgages. To do so, I believe,
would be difficult or impossible to achieve through any
feasible new incentives, and therefore my proposal instead
focuses primarily upon assisting underwater homeowners to
rationally assess their circumstances and then, if it is called
for, encouraging them to default on their loans and forcefully
demand substantial modifications as the price of cure. The
choice that loan servicers would then be presented with is
either to modify the loans substantially or proceeding with
foreclosures. Given this choice, the loan modification option
then becomes the far more attractive one for realizing
maximum value for the investors. Once these borrowers have
made clear to the loan servicers that the status quo of their
continuing to make their payments is not an option, and that
self-cure of their payment deficiencies simply will not occur,
and once the loan servicers also realize that the dreaded
contagion effect that they feared might result from their
168. Posner and Zingales themselves concede this point. "In fact, it is likely
that only a fraction [of those homeowners who could avail themselves of the
option presented to them by the Posner and Zingales plan] would do so." Id. at
592.
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engaging in significant loan modifications for some solvent
underwater borrowers has already pervasively occurred, then
and only then will the desired loan modifications take place.
In his work extensively discussed earlier in this article
Professor White has convincingly argued that it would be in
the best interest of many underwater homeowners to default
and endure foreclosure if they are not granted very
significant loan modifications. White further argues that
what is impeding homeowners in taking this action is a
combination of calculation difficulties, various cognitive
impairments, and especially the emotions of fear, shame, and
guilt associated with foreclosure. In his view, this association
is irrational and unfortunately reinforced by most of our
important social institutions including the federal
government. 6 9
While White recognized that a public
education-oriented approach, accompanied by enactment of a
few federal statutes protecting loan servicers from litigation
and limiting mortgage creditor remedies, such as I
recommend, "naturally follows" from his analysis and could
well be "effective" in obtaining the desired loan modifications,
he did not endorse this kind of approach to the problem
because of his concern that it would be "distasteful to most
policy makers." 70
Professors Posner and Zingales appear to be exactly the
kind of influential policy formulators and commentators that
White was referring to and seeks not to offend. Their plan
clearly does not try to encourage those underwater
homeowners whose best interests would be served by default
to realize this fact, and then to default so as to pressure their
loan servicers to engage in principal-reducing loan
modifications. Moreover, they go much further here than
White's prudential concerns, by characterizing such strategic
default behavior on the part of underwater homeowners as
evidencing a kind of moral failing that their plan is
specifically designed not to encourage.' 71 In their view, what
169. White, supra note 2, at 29.
170. Id. at 44.
171. Posner and Zingales make it quite clear that in their view a strategic
default by one who has the financial capability to continue making their
payments is an immoral act. Posner & Zingales, supra note 11, at 597.
One concern with this .

.

. plan is that it might .

.

. undermine the

moral standards that prevent families from defaulting, exacerbating
the very problem that it tries to resolve ..... While this is a possible
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is wrong with recommendations like my proposal is not
simply that it would be viewed as distasteful by policy
makers, but that it would be rightfully so condemned because
the strategic default behavior that I seek to encourage in
order to force loan servicers to make modifications would be
immoral.
Thus the contrast between our approaches is rather
sharply drawn. Posner, Zingales, White, and I all seek the
"elusive public policy holy grail" of having large numbers of
underwater homeowners enter into principal-reducing loan
modifications with their loan servicers.172 However, Posner
and Zingales believe that these modifications can be
effectively encouraged by legal changes that make them
somewhat more attractive to loan servicers, although these
very legal changes simultaneously and correspondingly make
the modifications somewhat less attractive to underwater
homeowners. They see no need for any measures that might
fundamentally change the thinking and behavior of those
homeowners to better understand their true interests and
then demand such modifications upon pain of default,
something Posner and Zingales regard as immoral. I disagree
with their moral stance, and I also do not feel that the
necessary loan modifications will occur unless and until
underwater homeowners threaten to default en masse if the
appropriate loan modifications are not made, thus leaving
their loan servicers with little choice but to accede to those
demands. Unlike Posner and Zingales, I have no qualms
about attempting to help these underwater homeowners
better understand where their true interests lie and then
encouraging them to act on that understanding.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are currently well over ten million underwater
homeowners, with an aggregate negative equity position of at

spillover effect, there are two factors that minimize this risk under our
plan.....
Id. They also criticize any loan modification plan that "could weaken the moral
stigma against defaulting on loans." Id. at 589. They defend their plan by
claiming that they "doubt that [the] plan will erode the stigma on default." Id.
at 595.
172. White, supra note 2, at 49-50.
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least $800 billion and possibly over $1 trillion.173 The
overwhelming majority of these people who can afford to do so
currently continue to make their mortgage payments, even
though it can be shown that for many of them their interests
would actually be better served by defaulting and going
through foreclosure. This is, therefore, a rather fragile and
unstable situation that could suddenly erupt with a rapid
cascade of millions of strategic defaults, potentially triggering
another large wave of foreclosures and potentially severe
macroeconomic dislocations. It is a matter of some urgency
that this situation be defused through the large-scale
modification of the mortgages of a substantial number of
these underwater homeowners, so as to sharply reduce or
even eliminate their negative equity positions. This problem
is all well understood, and the question is how best to
overcome the numerous obstacles that are impeding such
principal-reducing loan modifications from taking place.
These impediments are, as I have discussed, numerous and
complex.174 They include various cognitive impairments and
emotional factors that make it difficult for underwater
homeowners to rationally determine where their best
interests lie and to act accordingly by demanding such
modifications. These impediments also include numerous
reasons why loan servicers are reluctant to grant such
modifications, and reasons why the federal government has
so far been unable to effectively address this problem.
I have set forth recommendations as to how these
impediments can be best overcome.17 5 My proposal centers on
the implementation of a public education and assistance
program designed to assist underwater homeowners in
rationally assessing where their interests lie, and then to
encourage them to demand loan modifications, upon pain of
default, when this proves to be their best course of action. I
also have recommended the adoption of federal legislation
that would shelter loan servicers from litigation by their
mortgage investors, if those servicers had engaged in loan
modifications in good faith attempts to maximize investor
returns, and greater federal enforcement efforts to assure

173. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
174. See supra Parts II-III.
175. See supra Parts V-VI.

2011]1

UNDERWATER HOMEOWNERS

215

that loan servicers are placing their investors' interests
foremost in their decisions. Such legislation would encourage
servicers to respond to these homeowner demands with
principal-reducing loan modifications, rather than by
initiating foreclosure proceedings. In addition, I recommend
the adoption of federal legislation that would shelter
defaulting homeowners from liability for deficiency
judgments, and from tax liability, and that would prevent
loan servicers from reporting mortgage foreclosures to credit
rating agencies.
I have contrasted my proposal with a recent proposal
made by Professors Eric Posner and Luigi Zingales that
would amend Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code so as to
allow underwater homeowners to obtain loan modifications
that would substantially reduce or eliminate their negative
equity position, in exchange for granting their lenders a 50%
interest in any subsequent appreciation of the property.17 6
While their proposal would be a substantial improvement
over the current status quo, it would not be nearly as effective
in bringing about the needed loan modifications as would my
proposal.
The Posner and Zingales proposal is hamstrung by its
premise that it would be immoral for underwater
homeowners who are capable of making their current
mortgage payments to strategically default in order to obtain
substantial modifications of their loans, and that it would
therefore be bad public policy to encourage such behavior. I
I regard assisting underwater
have no such qualms.
homeowners to recognize where their true interests lie, and
encouraging them to strategically default when this is in their
interest, as the sine qua non to bring about the principalreducing loan modifications that we all seek and that are very
much needed. The anomaly here, if it may be called that, is
that the looming threat of millions of additional foreclosures
can only be avoided if these underwater homeowners threaten
en masse to bring this exact result about. Loan servicers will
enter into principal-reducing loan modifications on a large
scale only after many underwater homeowners show a
willingness to default and go through foreclosure if significant
Encouraging this
loan modifications are not granted.
176. See supra Part VI.
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willingness to default therefore (and somewhat paradoxically)
needs to be the central focus of our efforts to resolve the
problem.

